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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 
Vol. 55 JUNE 1957 
THE UNION OF LAW AND EQUITY 
A PREREQUISITE TO PROCEDURAL R.EVISIONt 
Charles W. Joiner* and Ray A. Geddes** 
THE HISTORICAL VIEWPOINT 
No. 8 
IN 1850, only thirteen years after its admission to the Union as a sovereign state, Michigan constitutionally acknowledged the 
currently popular proposition that law and equity procedure ought 
to be fused. The mandate was clear and simple; by the ratification 
of the 1850 Constitution the people of Michigan directed that 
"The legislature shall, as far as practicable, abolish distinctions 
between law and equity proceedings."1 However intense was the 
resistance at that time to the influence of the New York Field Code, 
and however ominous was the challenge to its sweeping reform, 
it must have been felt that the code objective of unified procedure 
was a meritorious one.2 Within the year the legislature took action 
to comply with the constitutional mandate. Its sole accomplish-
ment consisted of an act ordering the supreme court to adopt and 
revise rules so as to improve practice by "I. The abolishing of the 
t This paper was prepared for the guidance of a Committee on Michigan Procedural 
Revision jointly created by the Michigan Legislature, the Supreme Court of Michigan, 
and the Michigan State Bar to recommend revision of Michigan statutes and rules. Toe 
need for the joinder of law and equity procedure was thought to be so fundamental that 
this paper was prepared as a basic study for the committee. In it an attempt is made 
to bring to the attention of the Michigan lawyers, judges, and legislators an analysis of the 
Michigan Constitution, statutes, and cases and the experience of other states that have 
amalgamated law and equity procedure. We hope that this discussion will also be useful 
elsewhere in the field of procedural reform.-The Authors. 
• Professor of Law, University of Michigan; A.B. 1937, J.D. 1939, State University 
of Iowa; member, Iowa and Michigan Bars; Chairman, Joint Committee of the Michigan 
Judicial Conference, Michigan Legislature and Michigan State Bar on Michigan Procedural 
Revision.-Ed. 
•• Research Assistant, University of Michigan Law School; B.B.A. 1953, M.B.A. 1956, 
LL.B. 1956, University of Michigan; member, Michigan Bar.-Ed. 
1 MICH. CONST., arL 6, §5 (1850). 
2 New York had provided: "The distinctions between actions at law and suits in equity, 
and the forms of all such actions and suits heretofore existing, are abolished." N.Y. Laws 
(1848) c. 379, §62. 
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distinction between law and equity proceedings, as far as prac-
ticable ... .''3 
In 1887 the legislature took an additional step toward equating 
law and equity procedure. The statutes which established chancery 
procedure were amended by adding "and either party shall also 
be entitled to the right to a jury, to be demanded in the manner 
as in a suit at law, and the verdict of such a jury on any question 
of fact shall have the same force and effect in the circuit [court] in 
chancery, and in the supreme court on appeal, as the verdict of a 
jury in an action at law.''4 This attempt to "abolish the distinction 
between law and equity proceedings as far as practicable" by pro-
viding for the trial of all causes by procedure known at law was ill-
fated. It lasted only until 1889 when the Michigan Supreme Court, 
in Brown v. Kalamazoo Circuit ]udge,5 ruled the statute unconsti-
tutional on the ground that "It is within the power of the legisla-
ture to change the formalities of legal procedure, but it is not 
competent to make such changes as to impair the enforcement of 
rights.''6 The court made clear that neither the right to jury trial 
at law, nor the right to judge trial in chancery, could be impaired 
by legislative action. So far as the right to jury trial is concerned 
any effort to amalgamate the procedure at law and in equity must 
deal with issues historically legal or equitable. Blanket abolition 
of the distinctions without protecting the right to jury or judge 
trial on issues of fact could not be tolerated. 
The legislative conscience was apparently satisfied by its delega-
tion of power to the supreme court and its abortive attempt to 
equate chancery proceedings with those at common law. For sixty-
four years after its first action, bench and bar alike tolerated two 
separate courts and many forms of actions. Not until 1915 was the 
constitutional directive at least partially satisfied by a provision 
permitting transf~r of causes between the two sides of the court.7 
More than forty additional years have passed, a total of I 07 years 
since the original unequivocal directive, without full realization 
of the dream of those early Michigan citizens. 
Perhaps the more than half-century delay on Michigan's part 
was not harmful in light of the fact that the early attempts at 
3 Laws (1851) p. 108. 
4 Public Acts (1887) No. 267. 
5 75 Mich. 274, 42 N.W. 827 (1889). 
6Id. at 283. 
7 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §611.2. 
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amalgamation were treated harshly by the judges.8 Before action 
was taken in 1915, the evolution of blended procedure was pro-
ceeding well, and the early obstacles to its success were found to 
be surmountable. For example, the Supreme Court of Judicature 
Act of 18739 effectively wrought the consolidation of all the su-
perior courts of England. It combined all legal and equitable 
powers within one court, and then, for administrative convenience, 
sliced the great court into five separate divisions along the juris-
dictional channels of the old procedure while allowing cases to 
be transferred from one division to another without prejudice. So 
it was that Maitland prophesied: "The day will come when lawyers 
will cease to inquire whether a given rule be a rule of equity or a 
rule of common law: suffice it that it is a well established rule 
administered by the High Court of Justice."10 
Looking forward to that day, the United States Supreme Court, 
in 1912, promulgated equity rules 22 and 2311 which Congress 
supplemented and completed by the Law and Equity Act of 1915.12 
The new federal equity rules sought in a very moderate way the 
accomplishments of the English act. The remodeled framework 
became another example of what even conservative states could 
and ought to do in the way of reform. 
With the English and federal predecessor acts before them, 
the Michigan legislators adopted the Judicature Act of 1915 and 
by its provisions the aged mandate-by then reaffirmed in the Con-
stitution of 190818-was carried one step closer to realization. 
8 55 YALE L.J. 826 (1946); Clark and Wright, "The Judicial Council and the Rule-
Making Power: A Dissent and Protest," 1 SYRACUSE L. REY. 346 (1950); K.haras, "A Cen-
tury of Law-Equity Merger in New York," 1 SYRACUSE L. REv. 186 (1949); McArthur v. 
Moffet, 143 Wis. 564 at 567, 128 N.W. 445 (1910): "The cold, not to say inhuman, treatment 
of the infant Code received from the New York judges is a matter of history. They had 
been bred under the common-law rules of pleading and taught to regard that system as the 
perfection of logic, and they viewed with suspicion a system which was heralded as so 
simple that every man would be able to draw his own pleadings. They proceeded by 
construction to import into the Code rules and distinctions from the common-law system 
to such an extent that in a few years they had practically so changed it that it could 
hardly be recognized by its creators." 
9 35 & 36 Viet., c. 66. The present form of the act was enacted in 1925. For a history 
of English reform, see Sunderland, "The English Struggle for Procedural Reform," 39 
HARv. L. REY. 725 (1926); Millar, "The Old Regime and the New in Civil Procedure," 
14 N.Y. UNIV. L. REV. 1, 197 (1936-1937). 
10 MAm.AND, EQUITY 20 (1910). 
11226 U.S., Appendix 1. The indebtedness to English practice with respect to each rule 
is pointed out in HOPKINS, THE NEW FEDERAL EQUITY RULES, 8th ed., 37 et seq. (1933). 
12 38 Stat. 956 (1915). 
13 MICH. CONST., art. VII, §5. 
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That step was a short one, however, for the act required all civil 
actions to be characterized either legal or equitable and then 
forbade them to be joined. Each action so characterized had to 
be tried on the proper side of the court although transfer between 
sides was allowed. Commenting on the cautious transition to this 
conservative notion of a single court with double jurisdiction, Pro-
fessor Sunderland wrote: "It may be hoped that the good effects 
of the Act will so favorably impress the bar and the public that the 
way may be paved for a subsequent consolidation of jurisdic-
tions."14 
Twenty-three years later the consolidation of law and equity 
was completed in the federal system by the adoption of new court 
rules creating but one form of action.15 How unfortunate it is, 
that more than forty years after the passage of the Judicature Act, 
in the light of the overwhelming further reform in the federal 
courts and in many other American jurisdictions,16 that the con-
solidation which the constitution requires has not been attained. 
THE MERIT OF MERGER 
Aside from the constitutional admonition to abolish procedural 
distinctions, there are numerous independent reasons in support 
of full merger of law and equity. These are grounded for the most 
,part on trial convenience. At early common law the primary goal 
of pleading was to establish a single issue of fact or law to be pre-
sented in court for adjudication.17 Michigan was one of the first 
American jurisdictions to recognize the economic extravagance 
of this ancient pleading logic. By statute it was sought to save 
litigants the time and expense of several suits by allowing liberal 
joinder of causes of action. Thus a Michigan plaintiff may join 
as many causes as he has against a defendant. If it appears that the 
issues involved cannot be conveniently disposed of together the 
court may order separate trials.18 Convenience is the criterion 
upon which adjudication of all issues between identical parties 
in one proceeding depends. Other than this, the only substantial 
14 Sunderland, "The Michigan Judicature Act of 1915," 14 MICH. L. REv. 273 at 280 
(1916). 
15 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1938). 
16 A total of 29 jurisdictions have abolished the distinction between law and equity 
and have provided for a single cause of action. Authorities are collected in Appendix A. 
17 3 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, 4th ed., 639-656 (1935); Blume, "Theory 
of Pleading," 47 MICH. L. REv. 297 (1949). 
18 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §608.1. 
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limitation is the express statutory provision that legal and equitable 
causes may not be joined.19 
As far as it goes, Michigan's rule of convenience is a good one. 
Its marked success in actual practice has been evidenced by ever 
increasing adoption of free joinder provisions.20 However, every 
reason in support of that success applies with equal force to allow-
ing joinder of legal and equitable claims. Such an extension 
would complete the simplification of procedure already begun, 
so that all issues between parties could reach final settlement in the 
course of a single proceeding in a unified court. An analysis of the 
problems arising under Michigan's divided court system and a 
comparison with the practice of other jurisdictions follows. 
]oinder of Legal and Equitable Causes of Action 
It was early recognized that great injustices often resulted 
from the separation of law from equity.21 The archaic concept of 
two entirely separate courts was altered in Michigan by adoption 
of the Judicature Act of 1915 which provided for free transfer of 
causes between the law and equity sides of the court.22 To a large 
extent, this partial reform in court structure relieved Michigan 
suitors of the harsh inequity of summary dismissal whenever actions 
19 Subject to the chancery practice of granting legal relief as an incidental concomitant 
of the equitable relief. 
20 37 CoL. L. R.Ev. 462 (1937); MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HIS-
TORICAL PERSPECTIVE, c. X (1952); CLARK, CODE PLEADING, 2d ed., §68 (1947); BROWN, DIGEST 
OF PROCEDURAL STATUTES AND COURT RULES, c. 3, p. 87 (1954); Blume, "Free Joinder of 
Parties, Claims, and Counterclaims," 2 F.R.D. 250 (1941). 
21 ••• "the books are filled with cases, in which the injustice has been imposed upon 
parties, of suffering the loss of a substantial right, because of a mistake in the choice of a 
forum [law or chancery court], before which its enforcement was sought. If it were neces-
sary, scores of cases might be cited, in which, after a long and protracted controversy upon 
the merits, the cause ultimately turned upon the question of mistaken jurisdiction .••• 
"Shall we be told, that the jurisdictions are clearly defined, and that, if mistaken, it 
must be the fault of the party? Every person conversant with the subject, knows that it 
is often one of great doubt, and that courts themselves are involved in contradictory de-
cisions. The other objection to the two jurisdictions is still stronger. It cannot be wise to 
keep the machinery of justice so imperfect that one court shall not be able to decide the 
whole of a cause. • • • Though courts of equity have a rule, that when they have acquired 
jurisdiction for one purpose, they will retain it, so as to do complete justice between the 
parties, there are instances where a party is sent to law, after having obtained all that a 
court of equity could give him. So are there numerous instances, of parties driven into a 
court of equity to obtain adequate relief, after having e.xhausted all the powers of a court 
of law. And it has even happened, that there were different portions of the same claim, of 
which one belonged to a legal, and the other to an equitable tribunal." FIRST REPORT OF 
CO!IIMISSIONERS ON PRACTICE AND PLEADING (New York) 73-74, 146 (1848). See also A CEN· 
TURY OF LAw REFORM 177-240 (1901); LORD BOWEN, SELEcr EssAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN 
LEGAL HISTORY 516 (1907). 
22 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §611.2. The text of this statute is set out in the text 
at note 49 infra. 
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were commenced in the wrong court. However, the very same fac-
tors previously causing injustice still exist to foster inconvenience 
and delay in the trial of lawsuits, especially in the situations like 
those that follow. 
By express statutory prohibition, legal and equitable causes 
of action cannot be joined in Michigan.23 Two Michigan cases 
point up the inconvenience inherent in this restriction. Peczeniuk 
v. Danielak24 involved a bill to foreclose a real estate mortgage. 
Both the original mortgagor and the subsequent purchaser of the 
premises were joined as defendants. Each defendant filed a cross-
bill in the nature of indebitatus assumpsit against the other. The 
plaintiff abandoned his action leaving only the cross-bills between 
defendants, upon which the lower court rendered judgment. On 
appeal the whole action was dismissed, the court citing the statutory 
prohibition against joinder of legal and equitable causes and re-
mitting the defendants to actions at law.25 
A more recent case, Monroe v. Bixby,26 likewise involved a 
bill to foreclose, but the court here set aside a decree dismissing 
the bill. However, recovery was denied the plaintiff on a separate 
claim regarding furniture alleged to have been left on the premises 
when the mortgagor took possession. The court cited the Peczeniuk 
case in denying the latter claim. 
It is submitted that under procedure providing for but one 
cause of action, there could have been complete disposition of 
all the issues involved in these two cases in a single proceeding.27 
In both actions, evidence bearing on the legal issues in dispute 
was presented for the purpose of resolving the equitable question 
23 " ••• but legal and equitable causes of action shall not be joined." Mich. Comp. Laws 
(1948) §608.1. 
24 277 Mich. 151, 269 N.W. 125 (1936). 
25 The Michigan Supreme Court at page 153, sua sponte propounded the following 
question: "In this suit to foreclose a mortgage, with foreclosure abandoned by the plain-
tiff, what jurisdiction did the court have to enter an assumpsit judgment upon claims 
of one defendant against the other, arising out of alleged agreements wholly foreign to the 
foreclosure suit?" The record discloses no objection by either defendant to chancery's 
jurisdiction to try the matter. 
26 330 Mich. 353, 47 N.W. (2d) 643 (1951). 
21 In regard to the maintenance of cross-claims between defendants under the federal 
rules see amended rule 13 (g) and committee note of 1946 to amended § (g) for express 
authorization to state cross-claims "relating to any property arising out of the subject mat-
ter of the action." See also 3 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, 2d ed., §13.31 (1948). In regard 
to joinder of legal claims wholly independent of equitable claims under the federal rules, 
see Holcomb v. Holcomb, (D.C. Cir. 1954) 209 F. (2d) 794, where the court states, "It 
follows that a wife's suit to assert a right in her husband's property is distinct from and 
unrelated to her suit for divorce. Nevertheless two such actions may be joined, under 
Rule 18 (a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure .••• " 
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of foreclosure, and the conclusions drawn thereupon could have 
been used to resolve the legal claims at the same time.28 Admittedly, 
as the court stated in the Peczeniuk case, the cross-claim between 
co-defendants had nothing to do with plaintiff's right to foreclose. 
However, both defendants were present in court at the same time, 
each with a desire to settle the dispute between them that had 
arisen out of the property which was the subject matter of the 
action. Rather than having the distinction between law and equity 
as the arbitrary basis for compulsory separation of actions, trial 
convenience should dictate the result on this question. The trial 
convenience theory is recognized in the same section of the statute 
that prohibits the joinder of law and equity actions in respect to 
actions joined within each side of the court, thus bringing common 
sense to at least a portion of the actions filed.29 
Not only does the law-equity distinction in Michigan practice 
limit the joinder of wholly independent actions, but also it may 
result in a court being unable to grant all the relief necessary to 
complete disposition of a single cause of action. This result is 
illustrated in two recent cases, Kundel v. Portz30 and Bologa v. 
Pitsillos.31 Each plaintiff alleging misrepresentation brought an 
action at law to recover money paid under a contract to purchase 
and to cancel promissory notes given under said contract. Each 
was awarded a judgment on the merits, but both requests for can-
cellation of the notes were denied because the actions were brought 
on the law side of the court and only the judge sitting in chancery 
could so decree. This result necessitated a second suit in each case-
a needless burden upon the time of the court, the attorneys, and 
their clients. 
It may be argued that the plaintiff in each case initially should 
have brought his action in chancery since it is well established in 
Michigan that both law and chancery have concurrent jurisdiction 
to give relief for fraud.32 The power of equity to return the pur-
28 The effect of a demand for jury trial on any of the legal issues is discussed infra under 
the heading Judicial Marshaling of Trial. 
29 This discretion to order separate trials exists presently in Michigan with regard to 
joinder of separate causes within the two sides of the court. See Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) 
§608.1, wherein is found the provision as follows: "If it appear that any such causes of 
action cannot be conveniently disposed of together, the court may order separate trials .... " 
Similar provision would be carried over to a merged procedure by adoption of federal 
rule 42 (b), "The court in the furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice may order a 
separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counter-claim, or third party claim. . • ." 
so 301 Mich. 195, 3 N.W. (2d) 61 (1942). 
81308 Mich. 182, 13 N.W. (2d) 253 (1944). 
82 Marshall v. Ullmann, 335 Mich. 66, 55 N.W. (2d) 731 (1952); Fred Macey Co. v. 
Macey, 143 Mich. 138, 106 N.W. 722 (1906). 
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chase money and to cancel the notes would have avoided the 
necessity of two actions. This result is not as certain as it may first 
appear because of the possibility of an equitable defense being 
· sustained and thus defeating the power of equity to decide the case. 
For example, it is often difficult, as a practical matter, to determine 
whether delay in rescinding an allegedly fraudulent contract con-
stitutes affirmance of the bargain. In a decision involving facts 
substantially the same as those in the cases under consideration, 
the Michigan Supreme Court held that delay or laches short of the 
statute of limitations is not a defense to a later action at law for 
damages based on the fraud.33 Therefore, had either Kundel or 
Bologa been guilty · of laches, a second action at law would in-
evitably follow in order that relief could be given on the legal 
aspect of their claims. So there is possibility that two actions will 
be required to obtain a final settlement, no matter in which side 
of the court the action is commenced. Under merged procedure, 
legal and equitable causes of action may be joined. The court 
would thus have full power to grant both legal and equitable relief 
in cases like Kundel and Bologa. If an equitable rule such as laches 
is sustained to defeat a grant of equitable relief, the same court 
could determine the legal facet of the fraud. 
There are certain situations where legal and equitable causes 
may be joined by means of a doctrine called "equitable joinder." 
It was held early, in Michigan, that once equity had taken juris-
diction over the subject matter and over the parties for one pur-
pose, it would retain jurisdiction in order to settle all disputes 
relating to the same subject matter between the parties.34 Mich-
igan courts have, in fact, been rather liberal in allowing a joinder 
of related claims for legal and equitable relief on the equity side 
of the court.35 Bu~ before this rule can be applied, some ground of 
33 Poloms v. Peterson, 249 Mich. 306, 228 N.W. 711 (1930). 
34 Rickle v. Dow, 39 Mich. 91 (1878); Chase v. Boughton, 93 Mich. 285, 54 N.W. 44 
(1892). 
35 Following are typical situations: Action to Reform an Instrument and Recover on 
it as Reformed, Flanagan v. Harder, 270 Mich. 288, 258 N.W. 633 (1935); Action to Enjoin 
Continuing Tort and for Damages for Past Tort, The Epworth Assembly League v. Lud-
ington and Northern Ry., 223 Mich. 589, 194 N.W. 562 (1923); McDonald v. Sargent, 
308 Mich. 341, 13 N.W. (2d) 843 (1944); Rhoades v. McNamara, 135 Mich. 644, 98 N.W. 
392 (1904); Action for Specific Performance and Damages, Lamberts v. Lemley, 314 Mich. 
417, 22 N.W. (2d) 759 (1946); Schook v. Zimmerman, 188 Mich. 617, 155 N.W. 526 (1915); 
Frank v. Coyle, 310 Mich. 14, 16 N.W. (2d) 649 (1944); Action to Cancel Deed and to 
Recover Possession or Damages, Ronczkowski v. Jozwiak, 230 Mich. 327, 203 N.W. 105 
(1925); Action for Accounting and for Damages, Austin v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 291 
Mich. 513, 289 N.W. 235 (1939); Airport Recreation Club, Inc. v. Morris, 288 Mich. 694, 
286 N.W. 131 (1939); Action for Specific Restitution and for Damages, Heth v. Oxendale, 
238 Mich. 236,213 N.W. 133 (1927); Latimer v. Piper, 261 Mich. 123, 246 N.W. 65 (1933); 
Action to Quiet Title and for Damages, Matthews v. McLouth, 232 Mich. 468, 205 N.W. 
580 (1925). 
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equitable jurisdiction must first be asserted and established.36 
This, of course, limits the use of equitable joinder to cases where 
the legal relief is only incidental to the equitable purpose of the 
action. Moreover, along with the doctrine of equitable joinder 
must be considered the recent Michigan case of Michigan Bean Go. 
v. Burrel Engineering and Construction Co.37 Plaintiff filed a bill 
in equity to "remove cloud on title and for injunction" against 
Burrel and four materialmen, three of whom had filed liens on 
plaintiff's property newly constructed by Burrel.38 Upon final de-
cree, the lower court dismissed the bill of complaint as to all defend-
ants except Burrel. This left a plain action at law arising from a 
dispute over a building contract between plaintiff and Burrel, and 
the judgment as rendered contained no injunctive or equitable 
relief. On appeal, the court dismissed the bill without prejudice 
to either party to transfer the cause to the law side of the court. 
Thus, on the facts of this case, if plaintiff fails to establish a right to 
equitable relief, he can get no relief at all from the chancery side 
of the court. The impracticability of such a rule is obvious, since 
often a plaintiff does not know whether he has valid rights at 
law or in equity until a ruling is made by the court in which 
he dockets his action. The problem is not unique, for the rule 
of the Burrel case, and the pleading uncertainty it fosters, arises 
whenever a suitor may think he is entitled to either legal or 
equitable relief, or both, on a particular cause of action.39 
In addition to the more convenient administration of remedies, 
the ability to join legal and equitable causes of action would 
simplify Michigan pleading practice. Whenever an action is com-
menced, it must today be characterized as legal or equitable so 
that it may be docketed on the proper side of the court.40 One 
of the fundamental grounds for docketing an action on the equity 
side has traditionally been the inadequacy of the remedy at law. 
Therefore, it follows that in order to state a valid cause of action, 
the inadequacy of the legal remedy must appear in the bill of 
complaint, or otherwise chancery cannot take jurisdiction to try 
36 Sharon v. Fee, 203 Mich. 152, 168 N.W. 1045 (1918). 
37 306 Mich. 420, 11 N.W. (2d) 12 (1943). 
38 Plaintiff, in his brief, summarized that the bill was to "remove clouds on title, to 
determine invalidity of liens filed, to specifically enforce the Burrel obligation to write fixed 
price contract as agreed, to restrain fraudulent claims of baseless cost plus contract, to avoid 
multiplicity of suits in foreign jurisdicton." Plaintiff also asked that all defendants be re-
strained from bringing any other suits at law and a temporary injunction was, in fact, 
issued to that effect. 
39 For example, in any of the cases cited in note 35. 
40 "Section I. Civil actions are divided into equitable actions and actions at law .... " 
Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §611.1. 
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the action.41 Under merged procedure, if the legal remedy is 
adequate, there likewise can be no relief granted of an equitable 
nature. However, in most cases, this circumstance need not be 
made binding at the pleading stage of the trial; rather, legal and 
equitable relief is awarded according to which is warranted by the· 
proofs at trial.42 The question need not be considered until after 
it has been determined that the plaintiff is entitled to some relief 
of either nature. Even if Michigan were to retain the present 
pleading requirements,43 under a unified court system a failure to 
state facts sufficient to support a grant of equitable relief would 
/ not deprive the court of all jurisdiction to hear the cause. The 
equitable remedy could still be obtained in the same proceeding 
by amending the pleading in proper instances. Under this pro-
cedure the pleader would be saved the often impossible task of 
alleging his need for equity before an intelligent decision in the 
matter could be made. 
The benefits derived from the ability to join legal and equitable 
causes of action are now enjoyed in the federal and thirty-
three state jurisdictions.44 After providing for a single form of 
action,45 the federal rules further provide that a plaintiff "may 
join either as independent or as alternative claims as many claims 
either legal or equitable or both as he may have against an opposing 
party."46 Of the states, twenty-three achieve this result with similar 
rule or statutory language. Five imply as much from ~he creation 
of one form of action. Even Florida, Illinois, Iowa, and Oregon, 
states with two-sided courts, have expressly provided for joinder 
of legal and equitable claims in a single action, notwithstanding 
their otherwise divided court system. Most striking of all is the 
situation in New Jersey, where in 194 7 it was constitutionally 
provided that "4. Subject to the rules of the Supreme Court, the 
Law Division and the Chancery Division shall each exercise the 
powers and functions of the other division when the ends of justice 
so require, and legal and equitable relief shall be granted in any 
41 Marshall v. Ullmann, 335 Mich. 66, 55 N.W. (2d) 731 (1952); Cole v. McFall, 48 
Mich. 227, 12 N.W. 166 (1882). 
42 "Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by default, every final 
judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is en-
titled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings." Rule 54(c), 
Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., 28 U.S.C. (1952). 
43 See Mich. Court Rule 17 (1) (1945); Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §614.1. 
44 Citations of the relevant statutes and rules are collected in Appendix B. 
4l! "There shall be one form of action to be known as 'civil action.' " Rule 2, Fed. 
Rules Civ. Proc., 28 U.S.C. (1952). 
46 Rule 18 (a), Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., 28 U.S.C. (1952). 
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cause so that all matters in controversy between the parties may 
be completely determined."47 Michigan, however, is one of four-
teen states which still employ either separate courts entirely, or 
separate divisions within one court and which do not allow the 
joinder of legal and equitable claims.48 It is submitted that the 
establishing of a single form of action, together with a joinder rule 
similar to federal rule 18 (a), would cure this one important de-
fect in Michigan practice. Such a course would carry out the spirit 
of the liberal joinder of claims so long established as a part of 
Michigan procedure. 
Transfer of Actions Between Sides 
A much needed reform in Michigan's dual court system 
appeared in the Judicature Act of 1915, where it was provided: 
"If at any time it appear that a suit commenced in equity 
should have been brought as an action on the law side of the 
court, or if it appear that an action commenced on the law 
side of the court should have been brought in equity, it shall 
be forthwith transferred to the proper side, and be there pro-
ceeded with, with only such alteration in the pleadings as 
shall be essential."49 
This section of the act was based on the common sense idea 
that plaintiffs need not commence, nor defendants answer, a 
wholly new proceeding whenever, by initial mistake, the original 
cause was docketed on the wrong side of the court.150 The inequity 
of dismissing "mis-placed" actions was, in most cases, corrected; 
and, in addition, the free transfer provisi@n eliminated much of 
the time and effort that had formerly preceded trial on the merits. 
But even this admitted improvement in trial practice was but 
a partial reform. The ability to transfer causes did much to remove 
the rigid procedural barrier between the separate jurisdictions 
of law and equity, but left, as analysis will show, many of the 
appurtenant complexities inherent in divided practice. 
The earliest Michigan case illustrating one weakness of trans-
fer as a means for preventing procedural mistrial was that of 
47 N.J. CoNST., art. 6, §3, if 4. 
48 They are Alabama, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missis• 
sippi, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Virginia, Vermont, West 
Virginia. 
49 Mich. C.omp. Laws (1948) §611.2. 
liO Sunderland, "The Michigan Judicature Act of 1915," 14 MICH. L. REv. 273 (1916). 
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Brennen v. Livingston Circuit Judge,51 decided in 1924. An ac-
tion had been commenced in the Livingston county circuit court, 
in chancery, by a real estate broker suing on an exclusive agency 
contract. Service of process was made on defendants Brennen in 
Washtenaw County, which was the place of their residence. Upon 
defendants' motion to dismiss for want of equity jurisdiction, 
the court agreed that there existed an adequate remedy at law 
and transferred the case to the law side. After the law declaration 
had been served, defendants appeared specially and again moved 
to dismiss, this time on the ground that the court lacked jurisdic-
tion over the defendants in that original process had been served 
beyond the county lines, authorized in chancery suits but pro-
hibited in law actions.52 The motion was overruled and defendants 
Brennen sought review of the ruling by a mandamus proceeding 
against the trial judge. It was then held, by the Michigan Supreme 
Court, that service of process was insufficient, and the trial court 
was directed to dismiss the action. In the opinion, the court stated 
that "There is no language in the transfer statute suggesting a con-
struction by which jurisdiction over the person in an action at 
law may be served through commencing, as a suit in equity, a case 
which should have been brought as an action on the law side of the 
court and serving chancery process on a non-resident defendant 
outside of the county in which the case is begun."53 
This same problem has reached the Michigan Supreme Court 
on three successive occasions. In Baker v. Lansing Co.,54 a bill in 
equity was filed to obtain an accounting and money decree for 
lumber sold to defendant. Defendant's motion to dismiss for lack 
of equity was denied in the circuit court. Interlocutory appeal 
of the ruling was denied, without prejudice, and the case remanded 
for hearing. Trial on the. merits proceeded, resulting in a money 
decree for plaintiff based on evidence of admissions in letters 
and records of defendant's officers. After completion of the trial 
and award of the decree, the appellate court held that plaintiff 
did have, on the basis of the trial record, an adequate remedy at 
51229 Mich. 426,201 N.W. 467 (1924). 
52 "Sec. 27. All civil process issued from any court of record may be served anywhere 
within the state where the party upon whom service is to be made may be found, in the 
following cases: 
1. When the process is issued out of a court in chancery; 
2. When the process is issued out of a court at law, when the suit is brought in the 
county where the defendant, or one of the defendants if there be more than one, re-
sides .... " Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §613.27. 
53 229 Mich. 426 at 430. 
54 307 Mich. 493, 12 N.W. (2d) 377 (1943). 
1957] UNION OF LAW AND EQUITY 1071 
law. The action was dismissed rather than transferred on the same 
grounds given in the Brennen case. In the subsequent cases of 
Cyril ]. Burke, Inc. v. Eddy & Co., Inc.rm and Marshall v. Ull'-
mann56 analogous fact situations were presented, but because of 
interlocutory appellate rulings on the motions to dismiss, both suits 
were, in fact, dismissed before time and effort were expended on a 
needless trial of the merits. 
As these cases show, the ability to transfer freely between sides 
of the court has not entirely prevented dismissal of actions com-
menced on the wrong side of the court. Existing provisions regard-
ing the range of process have, in certain instances, rendered the 
transfer provision ineffective. A plaintiff suing out-of-county resi-
dents in equity risks dismissal rather than transfer whenever ob-
jection is made to the jurisdiction of equity over the subject matter. 
In cases like Baker v. Lansing, where the character of the action 
was not clear until trial was had, the lapse of time before dismissal 
may be sufficient to bar the action from ever being brought. In all 
cases where interlocutory review is had to obtain a conclusive 
ruling as to jurisdiction, the delay and expense is substantial. A 
modern society should not tolerate the delay, expense and even 
deprivation of rights made necessary under present statutes. 
Michigan's transfer statute is a verbatim copy of federal equity 
rule 22, superseded, in 1938, by the new federal rules providing a 
complete merger of law and equity proceedings.57 Many of the 
weaknesses of free transfer can be observed by comparing it with 
the practice under a completely merged procedure. The most 
obvious difference is the elimination of the need for transfer in a 
unified court with one form of action. Because there is no un-
necessary procedural distinction between law and equity under 
federal practice, there is only one place to commence a civil 
action.58 Under Michigan practice, however, a motion to transfer 
a cause to the opposite side of the court involves a determination 
of whether the action is legal or equitable. Such a determination 
involves a delay in getting to the merits of the claim. The length 
of this delay depends, to a great extent, on how clearly legal or 
55 332 Mich. 300, 51 N.W. (2d) 238 (1952). 
M 335 Mich. 66, 55 N.W. (2d) 731 (1952). 
57 Grauman v. City Co. of New York, (S.D. N.Y. 1939) 31 F. Supp. 172. For a detailed 
discussion of federal equity practice under this rule, see 2 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcnCE, 2d ed., 
§2.03 (1948). 
58 "The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have abolished the forms of action and 
procedural distinctions, and provide for a single action and mode of procedure." Ransom 
v. Staso Milling Co., (D.C. Vt. 1941) 2 F.R.D. 128. 
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equitable the particular action happens to be. From the cases 
discussed above it is apparent that interlocutory appeal or man-
damus is sometimes required when the character of the action is 
not clear.59 Actions commenced in equity may have to be trans-
ferred if at any time during the course of the trial the facts support-
ing equitable jurisdiction cannot be established or become 
altered.60 Under blended procedure the court may determine the 
legal issues, if any, in whatever manner convenience allows when 
facts supporting the equitable claim evaporate.61 Trial conven-
ience is not a criterion by which Michigan judges may retain 
jurisdiction and dispose of all the issues between the parties, be-
cause if the nature of the action is clearly legal, the court must 
transfer it to the law side.62 On the other hand, if neither party 
moves for transfer during the course of the trial, the appellate 
court may dismiss the action upon a holding that trial was had on 
the wrong side. 63 
Equitable Defenses to Actions at Law 
At the present time in Michigan, a separate chancery suit is 
required whenever a defendant wishes to assert an equitable rule 
or principle as a defense to a legal cause of action.64 A court of law 
has no jurisdiction to apply- rules of equity, even when to do so 
would necessarily defeat or diminish an otherwise valid legal 
claim.65 For example, a defense to an ejectment action cannot be 
based upon grounds that the deed involved was drawn under a 
mutual mistake of fact, for the Michigan Supreme Court has stated: 
59 That mandamus will issue in order to correct an erroneous order of transfer, see 
Commissioner of Insurance v. Lapeer Circuit Judge, 302 Mich. 614, 5 N.W. (2d) 505 (1942). 
60 In contract action for injunction and specific relief, where agreement had six months 
to run at time suit was commenced, held, expiration of the six month period before case 
could be heard on the merits made transfer not only proper, but obligatory. White Star 
Refining Co. v. Evans, 269 Mich. 636, 257 N.W. 915 (1934); and comment, 14 MrcH. S.B.J. 
358 at 360 (1935). See also Christian v. Porter, 340 Mich. 300, 65 N.W. (2d) 779 (1954). 
61 Infra, Joinder of Legal and Equitable Causes of Action. 
62 Christian v. Porter, 340 Mich. 300, 65 N.W. (2d) 779 (1954); White Star Refining 
Co. v. Evans, 269 Mich. 636, 257 N.W. 957 (1934); Lake Superior Brass Foundry Co. v. 
Houghton Circuit Judge, 209 Mich. 380, 176 N.W. 409 (1920). 
63 Kamulski v. Head, 317 Mich. 132, 26 N.W. (2d) 735 (1947); Policha v. Voss, 292 
Mich. 494, 290 N.W. 881 (1940). Such dismissals are made without prejudice to either 
party to move the trial court for transfer within a specified period after the appeal decision, 
provided, of course, there is no personal jurisdiction problem. 
64 Olmstead v. Johnson, 313 Mich. 57, 20 N.W. (2d) 809 (1945); Barker v. Klingler, 
302 Mich. 282, 4 N.W. (2d) 596 (1942); Scott v. Grow, 301 Mich. 226, 3 N.W. (2d) 254 
(1942); Thompson v. Doore, 269 Mich. 466, 257 N.W. 864 (1934); Bush v. Merriman, 87 
Mich. 260, 49 N.W. 567 (1891); Jeffery v. Hursh, 42 Mich. 563, 4 N.W. 303 (1880). 
65 Critz v. Cropsey, 190 Mich. 690, 157 N.W. 356 (1916); Barnes v. Spencer & Barnes 
Co., 162 Mich. 509, 127 N.W. 752 (1910); Dole v. McGraw, 71 Mich. 106, 38 N.W. 686 
(1888); Gardiner v. Fargo, 58 Mich. 72, 24 N.W. 655 (1885). 
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"In this State the distinction between law and equity, as 
applied to remedies, has been kept up. The courts of law have 
no jurisdiction to reform written agreements. The jurisdic-
tion is exclusively vested in courts of equity, and it has long 
been settled that if, by reason of fraud, mistake, accident, or 
surprise, an instrument does not express the true intent and 
meaning of the parties, equity will upon satisfactory evidence 
reform it."66 
The additional formality required by a separate suit in chan-
cery may cause delay and expense both to the court and to the 
parties. The parties must prepare and file two sets of pleadings. 
The plaintiff in equity must set forth, in his complaint, facts suffi-
cient to support a decree for the relief requested. If it is desirable 
to restrain further prosecution of the law action, he is required 
in addition to pray for a temporary injunction.67 Process must be 
issued and served as in any chancery suit.68 When the defendant 
answers, he may be restrained from proceeding with his legal action 
until the court, in chancery, disposes of the equitable claims which 
might affect the outcome of that action.69 If the legal action re-
strained is a personal action, the party applying for the injunction 
must post a bond to cover damages and costs that might result from 
the stay of proceedings.70 This is mandatory and cannot be dis-
pensed with by the court.71 If the action restrained is one for 
the recovery or possession of real property, a similar bond must 
be executed if that action is stayed after verdict has been ren-
66 Bush v. Merriman, 87 Mich. 260 at 268, 49 N.W. 567 (1891). 
67 "Sec. 3. Where an injunction or temporary injunction or other extraordinary 
process is desired, the same shall be prayed for specifically. The prayer for summons may 
be omitted and the plaintiff shall be entitled to process of summons on filing the bill of 
complaint, and to other process when prayed for and ordered by competent authority." 
Michigan Court Rule 21 (1945). 
6Blbid. 
69 See, e.g., Noble v. Grandin, 125 Mich. 383, 84 N.W. 465 (1900) (contract action en-
joined); Gross v. Kay, 330 Mich. 156, 47 N.W. (2d) 59 (1951) (action on a check enjoined); 
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Freedman, 159 Mich. 114, 123 N.W. 547 (1909) (action on 
insurance policy enjoined); Maes v. Olmsted, 247 Mich. 180, 225 N.W. 583 (1929) (action 
of ejectment enjoined). 
70 "No injunction shall issue to stay the trial of any personal action in a court of law, 
until the party applying therefor shall execute a bond with one (1) or more sufficient 
sureties, to the plaintiff in such action at law, in such sum as the circuit judge or other 
officer allowing the injunction shall direct, conditioned for the payment to the said plaintiff, 
or his legal representatives, of all moneys which may be recovered by said plaintiff, or his 
representatives, or the collection of which may be stayed by such injunction, in such action 
at law, for the debt or damages, and for the costs therein; and also for the payment of 
such costs as may be awarded to them in the court in chancery, in the suit in which such an 
injunction shall issue." Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §619.8. 
71 Quail v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 249 Mich. 425, 228 N.W_ 775 (1930). 
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dered.72 It is discretionary with the court to require a bond upon 
issuance of a preliminary injunction whenever there is no rule or 
statute so requiring.73 
The additional formality required by the divided procedure, 
together with the need for restraining further proceedings in the 
original law action, could be wholly eliminated by combining the 
separate jurisdictions of law and equity. In the federal courts, for 
example, a party defending against a legal claim is allowed to plead, 
in his answer, any equitable claims he may have against his oppo-
nent. 74 Likewise, an attack on such an equitable claim can be made 
by reply if the claim has been denominated as a counterclaim or 
if the court feels a reply would be desirable.75 In other words, the 
substance of purely equitable matters may be set forth, in a unified 
procedural system, in the same pleading that Michigan procedure 
would limit to law matters. 
Furthermore, if all claims and defenses between the parties can 
be presented in a single action, there is no need to issue a pre-
liminary injunction or to execute a statutory bond. While it may 
be advantageous to determine the equitable matters before the 
legal claims, the trial judge does not have to enjoin anyone from 
proceeding with the legal aspects of the case. The priority of 
equity is maintained when convenient, under merged procedure, 
by the court's discretion to order hearings on the equitable issues 
before taking up the legal issues.76 
The needless procedural formality of separate actions at law 
and in equity to resolve a single dispute is avoided in the twenty-
nine jurisdictions where procedural differences between law and 
equity have been abolished in favor of one form of action.77 Ten 
states with divided courts, in an effort to accomplish the results 
of a unified procedure, have recognized the practical advantage 
72 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §619.13. The provision is mandatory. Chamberlain v. 
Durfee, 264 Mich. 194,249 N.W. 486 (1933). 
73 Barkovits v. Veres, 254 Mich. 543, 236 N.W. 857 (1931); American Foundry &: Ma-
chinery Co. v. Charlevoix Circuit Judge, 138 Mich. 167, 101 N.W. 210, (1904). 
74 "The plaintiff in his complaint or in a reply setting forth a counterclaim and the 
defendant in an answer setting forth a counterclaim may join either as independent or as 
alternate claims as many claims either legal or equitable or both as he may have against 
an opposing party." Rule 18 (a), Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., 28 U.S.C. (1952). 
75 "There shall be a complaint and an answer; and there shall be a reply to be coun-
terclaim denominated as such; • • • No other pleading shall be allowed, except that 
the court may order a reply to an answer or a third party answer." Rule 7 (a), Fed. Rules 
Civ. Proc., 28 U.S.C. (1952). 
76 This subject and the effect of a timely demand for jury trial is discussed infra under 
the heading Judicial Marshaling of Trial. 
77 Citations of the relevant statutes and rules are collected in Appendix A. 
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of pleading "equitable defenses" in actions at law, and haye en-
acted statutes permitting it, making a total of 39 jurisdictions 
allowing the pleading of equitable defenses.78 Only Michigan and 
eight other states still require equitable claims and defenses to 
be tried in a separate action in chancery.79 
The adoption of the so-called "equitable defense" statutes with-
out a full consolidation of law and equity proceedings has not 
proved satisfactory.80 As Professor Hinton points out, an equi-
table defense is not actually a defense at all, but rather a claim for 
affirmative relief historically cognizable only in equity.81 For 
example, a claim of fraud or mistake may be grounds for reforma-
tion or cancellation of an instrument in equity. Nothing about 
such an affirmative claim is in the nature of a defense. Yet when 
the instrument is sued upon in an action at law, recovery may 
be diminished or even denied if the equitable grounds for reforma-
tion or cancellation can be asserted successfully. In this respect, 
the assertion of equitable claims of fraud or mistake appears to be 
a defensive tactic but is not strictly a defense. 
This historical conception has caused unsatisfactory results 
under many equitable defense statutes. Construction of such 
statutes has resulted in three general interpretations of what can be 
pleaded as an equitable defense. The first is to the effect that any 
equitable matter, which if sued upon in chancery would have 
restrained the pending law action, could be pleaded as a defense 
to the law action. The Oregon provision and the decisions under 
it are illustrative of this view.82 This provision appears reason-
ably satisfactory since the basic purpose of eliminating two separate 
actions where one would be enough is, to some extent, accom-
plished. Nevertheless, the court must decide at the pleading stage 
what equitable matters are material to the defense.83 Equitable 
78 Citations of the relevant statutes and rules are collected in Appendix C. 
79 They are Delaware, Michigan, Mississippi, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, 
Virginia, Vermont, and West Virginia. 
so Hinton, "Equitable Defenses Under the Codes," 18 MICH. L. REv. 717 (1920); 
Cook, "Equitable Defenses," 32 YALE L.J. 645 (1923); CLARK, CODE PLEADING, 2d ed., §98 
(1947); McBaine, "Equitable Defenses to Actions at Law in the Federal Courts," 17 CALIF. 
L. R.Ev. 592 (1929); Adains, "Federal Practice as to Equitable Defenses in Actions at Law," 
10 A.B.A.J. 467 (1924); POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, 5th ed., §§1366-1374 (1941). 
81 Hinton, "Equitable Defenses Under the Codes," 18 MICH. L. REv. 717 (1920). 
82 " ••• [C]ross-bills are abolished; .•• [and] in an action at law where the defendant 
is entitled to relief, arising out of facts requiring the interposition of a court of equity, 
and material to his defense, he may set such matter up by answer, without the necessity 
of filing a complaint on the equity side of the court. ... " Ore. Rev. Stat. (1953) §16.460; 
comment, 34 ORE. L. R.Ev. 55 (1954). 
83 Hunt v. Bishop, 191 Ore. 541, 229 P. (2d) 960 (1951); Jacobson v. Wheeler, 191 Ore. 
384, 230 P. (2d) 550 (1951). 
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issues setting forth a counterclaim cannot appear in the answer 
for the statute authorizes the pleading of defenses only.84 Further-
more, there is danger that the right to jury trial would be unduly 
expanded under a statute that makes historically equitable issues 
into defenses at law. Indeed, this has been thought to be the 
reason for the remaining two interpretations which define an equi-
table defense more narrowly.85 
The second interpretation of what may be pleaded as an equi-
table defense can be summarized by saying that some, but not all, 
equitable matters can be pleaded by way of answer to an action 
at law. It is impossible to classify all the grounds that have been 
relied on in the effort to determine the scope of an equitable 
defense within this category, but a decision construing the Maine 
statute is typical of this narrower view.86 The case involved an 
action to foreclose a mortgage on real property. The answer 
alleged that the instrument was created under mutual mistake, and 
that if reformed, as it ought to be, the plaintiff would have no 
present right to foreclose. In ruling that such matter could not 
be pleaded by way of defense, the Maine Supreme Court said: 
"This right of reformation of a written instrument is not 
mere matter of defense to an action in which the instrument 
is set up as the basis or source of a right. It is an independent 
affirmative right arising as soon as the instrument is delivered. 
Being independent of any action at law and requiring decrees 
in equity for its enforcement, it should be enforced by a sep-
arate suit in equity and not interposed· as an equitable defense 
to an action at law. . . . The statute, R.S., ch. 84, sec. 17, 87 does 
not go so far as to provide that it shall, or even may, be done 
in an action at law."88 
· Thus it can be seen that under such a statute, construed as it 
was by the Maine court, there would be no procedural simplifica-
tion in cases like Bush v. Merriman}9 discussed previously. There 
84 Hamilton v. Hamilton Mammoth Mines, 110 Ore. 546, 223 P. 926 (1924). 
8lS Hinton, "Equitable Defenses Under the Code," 18 MICH. L. REv. 717 at 732 (1920). 
86 Martin v. Smith, 102 Me. 27, 65 A. 257 (1906). The equitable defense statute then 
governing provided: "Any defendant may plead in defense to any action at law in the 
supreme judicial court, any matter which would be ground for relief in equity, and shall 
receive such relief as he would be entitled to receive in equity, against the claims of the 
plaintiff; such matter of defense shall be pleaded in the form of a brief statement under the 
general issue. And, by counter brief statement, any plaintiff may plead any matter which 
would be ground for relief in equity against any defense set up by any defendant in an 
action at law in said court, and shall receive such relief as he would be entitled to receive 
in equity against such claim of defendant." Maine Rev. Stat. (1903) c. 84, §17. 
87Ibid. 
88 Martin v. Smith, 102 Me. 27 at 32. 
89 87 Mich. 260, 49 N.W. 567 (1891). 
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are few equitable matters that could not, with historical justifica-
tion, be called independent and affirmative. To do so would 
render the equitable defense statute completely meaningless. 
The 1915 amendment to the judicial code provided an equi-
table defense statute in federal procedure. 90 The construction 
given this provision by the federal judges represents the third inter-
pretation of an equitable defense statute. The statute provides no 
new defenses, but rather provides a new way of obtaining equitable 
relief by the device of a cross-action. Thus it was stated by the 
Eighth Circuit: 
"We are clearly of the opinion that, when equitable relief 
is asked in an action at law under the statute above quoted, 
the case for equitable relief should be tried as a case in equity, 
and that the great weight of authority is in favor of the prac-
tice of trying the case in equity first, for this practice serves 
to keep the equitable matter distinct, and to prevent what 
otherwise must frequently ensue-confusion and embrass-
ment in the progress of the action."91 
This idea was subsequently followed by later constructions of 
the provision.92 It would appear that such a statute would do 
little to simplify present Michigan procedure, since as interpreted 
by the federal courts the distinction between actions at law and 
suits in equity was maintained. The federal practice of always 
trying the equitable cross-action before the law action preserves 
the absolute priority given to suits in equity by the Michigan 
practice of restraining further proceedings at law. The better 
practice, from the standpoint of trial convenience would be to 
allow the trial judge discretion to order trial of the issues, whether 
legal or equitable, in whatever order the exigencies of the case 
before him required.93 
The foregoing equitable defense interpretations result from 
provisions in jurisdictions with otherwise divided courts of law 
and equity. It should be noted that the same problems have arisen 
under merged procedures in circumstances where the pleader is 
90 "In all actions at law equitable defenses may be interposed by answer, plea, or 
replication without the necessity of filing a bill on the equity side of the court. The de-
fendant shall have the same rights in such case as if he had filed a bill embodying the 
defense of seeking the relief prayed for in such answer or plea. Equitable relief respecting 
the subject matter of the suit may thus be obtained by answer or plea. In case affirmative 
relief is prayed in such answer or plea, the plaintiff shall file a replication." 38 Stat. 956 
(1915). 
91 Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Syas, (8th Cir. 1917) 246 F. 561 at 566. 
92 Fay v. Hill, (8th Cir. 1918) 249 F. 415; Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon Nat. Bank, 260 
U.S. 235 (1922). 
93 This subject is discussed infra under the heading Judicial Marshaling of Trial. 
1078 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55 
required to state in his answer or reply, whether the equitable 
matter pleaded is a defense or a counterclaim.94 The historical 
conception of the affirmative nature of equitable relief as observed 
by Professor Hinton has made impossible a clearcut distinction 
between equitable defenses and counterclaims.95 If the pleader 
is rigidly required to apply the correct label to the equitable matter 
set forth in the answer or reply, undue procedural formality will 
result in cases where the wrong name has been used. In an effort 
' to provide a clearer test some courts in the code states have stated 
that equitable matter calling for affirmative relief is a counterclaim, 
while equitable matter not requiring affirmative relief is a de-
fense.96 However, such a test is not practical as its effect is to shift 
the problem of defining a defense to that of defining affirmative 
relief, equally subject to confusion. Courts can hold that all equi-
table relief is affirmative by using the historical analogy previously 
discussed. 
The practice under present federal procedure has been most 
satisfactory.97 Discretion is given to the court, on terms, to treat 
pleading improperly designated as properly designated.98 If the 
opposite party is led to believe that a counterclaim is a defense 
because it was mistakenly named, the court, under rule 7 (a), has 
the discretion to permit a reply, and thus allow a defense to such 
counterclaim.99 
Counterclaim 
In Michigan tb,ere are several methods by which a defendant 
may assert a claim against a plaintiff. The common law right of 
recoupment has been recognized by statute.100 It allows a defend-
94 Note 80 supra. 
95 Note 81 supra. 
96 See, e.g.; Susquehanna S. S. Co. v. A. 0. Andersen & Co., 239 N.Y. 285, 14.6 N.E. 381 
(1925); Chicago & N.W. R. Co. v. McKeigue, 126 Wis. 574, 105 N.W. 1030 (1906). 
97 CLARK, CODE PLEADING, 2d ed., §98 (1947). 
98 " ... When a party has mistakenly designated a defens"e as a counterclaim or a 
counterclaim as a defense, the court on terms, if justice so requires, shall treat the pleading 
as if there had been a proper designation." Rule 8 (c), Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., 28 U.S.C. 
(1952). 
99 Note 75 supra. 
100 "In any action, in any court, if the defendant shall claim damages by way of re• 
coupment, by plea or otherwise, in pursuance of the rules and practices of such court, and 
on the trial of the issue formed, if the court or the jury trying the same shall find such 
defendant entitled to an amount of damages, whether liquidated or not, greater than the 
amount of the demand of the plaintiff, the court shall give judgment according to the true 
right thereof for the defendant, for the amount of such excess so found and costs, and 
issue execution therefor against the plaintiff, as in cases of judgment and execution on plea 
or notice of off-sets." Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §615.10. 
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ant to recover damages due him based on the cross-liability of the 
plaintiff growing out of the same transaction.101 A statutory right 
of set-off is also provided whereby a defendant may reduce his 
liability by setting off claims arising from judgment or contract.102 
If such claims result in a balance due the defendant, an affirmative 
judgment may be rendered accordingly.103 In addition to set-off 
and recoupment, a defendant to any action based on grounds of 
negligence or breach of statutory duty may file a cross-declaration 
of negligence based on the occurrence forming the basis of the 
plaintiff's case.104 In chancery cases for the payment and recovery 
of money set-off is allowed in the same manner as in actions at 
law.1011 The more usual method of obtaining affirmative relief 
from a plaintiff in chancery, however, is by cross-bill.106 
No matter which of these methods are used by a defendant, it 
is clear that he is not allowed to allege against a plaintiff an equi-
table claim in a law action or a legal claim in chancery. It has been 
101 Ladd v. Reed, 320 Mich. 167, 30 N.W. (2d) 822 (1948); Meyers v. Jay-Bee Realty 
Corp., 300 Mich. 522, 2 N.W. (2d) 488 (1942). 
102 "In the following cases and under the following circumstances a defendant may set 
off demands which he has against the plaintiff: 
I. It must be a demand arising upon judgment or decree, or upon contract express or 
implied •.. ; 
2. It must be due to him in his own right . . • ; 
3. It must have existed at the time of commencement of the suit, and must then have 
belonged to the defendant; 
4. It can be allowed only in actions found upon demands which could themselves 
be the subject of set-off according to law; 
5. If there be several defendants, the demand set-off must be due to all of them 
jointly •.. ; 
6. It must be a demand existing against the plaintiff in the action, unless the suit 
be brought in the name of a plaintiff having no real interest in the contract upon which 
the suit is founded .•.• " Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §615.1. 
103 "If there be found a balance due from the plaintiff in the action to the defendant, 
judgment shall be rendered for the defendant for the amount thereof .••. " Mich. Comp. 
Laws (1948) §615.5. 
104 "In any action hereafter brought in any court of the state to recover damages for 
any injury to person or property, wherein recovery is sought because of the alleged 
negligence of the defendant, •.• or for the alleged breach of a statutory duty owing there-
by, such a defendant may at the time of filing and serving bis plea, also file and serve a 
cross-declaration against the plaintiff setting forth the facts in any cause of action for dam-
ages or injury to his person or property because of the alleged negligence of the plaintiff 
••• arising out of the occurrence, forming the basis of the plaintiff's case •.•. " Mich. Comp. 
Laws (1948) §615.ll. 
105 "In suits in equity for the payment and recovery of money, set-offs shall be allowed 
in the same manner, and with the like effect, as in actions at law." Mich. Comp. Laws 
(1948) §615.9. 
100 "In any action in equity where a defendant desires to obtain affirmative relief 
against a plaintiff or co-defendant, he may file a cross bill." Michigan Court Rule 22, §1 
(1945); the issues raised by the cross bill must be germane to the original bill, Youngs v. 
West, 317 Mich. 538, 27 N.W. (2d) 88 (1947); American State Bank of Detroit v. Van Dyke, 
278 Mich. 471, 270 N.W. 753 (1936). 
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repeatedly held that a court of law has no jurisdiction to try an 
equitable right asserted by way of set-off or recoupment.107 Simi-
larly, a cross-claim will not be tried in equity if the defendant would 
have an adequate remedy by asserting the claim as an original 
action at law.108 Therefore, every claim a defendant has against 
his opponent, which, because of the distinction between law and 
equity cannot be used to defeat recovery by plaintiff, must be tried 
in a separate action. The additional procedural formality involved 
in two separate actions has been discussed with respect to pleading 
equitable defenses to actions at law.109 The inconvenience in-
volved in requiring that separate claims be made is as great as the 
inconvenience of requiring separate actions for equitable defenses. 
Indeed, the historical nature of equitable rights prevents a clear 
distinction between an equitable defense and an equitable claim.11° 
Every reason for allowing equitable defenses to actions at law 
applies with equal force to allowing affirmative equitable claims 
to be asserted by a defendant at law. 
Many jurisdictions have recognized the convenience of plead-
ing equitable counterclaims to actions for legal relief, and vice 
versa. For example, Ohio allows a defendant to assert substan-
tially the same claims against a defendant as does Michigan; that 
is, claims arising from . the same transaction or from contract or 
judgment.111 But because Ohio has established a single form of 
civil action,112 it has been provided that such claims can be pleaded 
without regard to ~eir legal or equitable nature.113 Illinois courts 
have, like Michigan's, a law and an equity side.114 Unlike either 
Michigan or Ohio provisions, that jurisdiction permits a defendant 
to plead any claim he may have against a plaintiff, without regard 
107 Note 65 supra. 
108 Landskroener v. Henning, 221 Mich. 558, 191 N.W. 943 (1923). 
109 Supra, under heading Equitable Defenses to Actions at Law. 
ll0ibid. 
111 "A counterclaim is a cause of action existing in favor of one or more defendants 
against one or more plaintiffs or one or more defendants, or both, between whom a sev-
eral judgment might be had in the action, and arising out of the contract or transaction 
set forth in the petition as the foundation of the plaintiff's claim, or connected with the 
subject of the action or arising out of contract or ascertained by the decision of a 
court ... .'' Ohio Rev. Code (Baldwin, 1953) §2309.16. 
112 "There shall be but one form of action, to be known as a 'civil action.' " Ohio Rev. 
Code (Baldwin, 1953) §2307.02. 
113 "The defendant may set forth in his answer as many grounds of defense or counter-
claim as he has, whether such are legal or equitable, or both .•.. " Ohio Rev. Code (Bald-
win, 1953) §2309.14. 
114 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 110, §44. 
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to the contract, judgment, or transaction limitations,115 and with-
out regard to the legal or equitable nature of the claim.116 The 
federal rules contain the modem provisions of both Ohio and 
Illinois. A defendant to a civil action in a federal court may join 
any claims he has against an opposing party,117 subject only to 
separation so as to avoid prejudice or to further convenience.118 
No effort is herein made to point out the merits of various 
counter-claim rules. Whatever counter-claim rule a jurisdiction 
may adopt, the merger of law and equity actions into a single civil 
action is the logical method of accomplishing the desired result 
of not arbitrarily requiring separate actions at law and equity, of 
matters that should properly be tried at one time. All in all, 
thirty-five jurisdictions, most of which have the fused procedure, 
allow equitable counterclaims to be pleaded in an action for legal 
relief.119 Michigan and twelve others have no provision authoriz-
ing the assertion of an equitable counterclaim in a law action.120 
LIMITATIONS UPON MERGER 
The Michigan Constitution does not define the extent to which 
it would be practicable to abolish the distinctions between law and 
equity proceedings. From the adoption and continued success of 
blended systems in the majority of American jurisdictions,121 it 
would seem that a complete initial abolition is• both possible and 
practicable. However, the history of the union of law and equity 
in other jurisdictions is replete with opposition based upon the 
115 "Subject to rules, any demand by one or more defendants against one or more 
plaintiffs, or against one or more codefendants, whether in the nature of set-off, recoup-
ment, cross-bill in equity, cross demand or otherwise, and whether in tort or contract, for 
liquidated or unliquidated damages, or for other relief, may be pleaded as a cross demand 
in any action, and when so pleaded shall be called a counterclaim." Ill. Rev. Stat. (1955) 
c. 110, §38. 
116 " ••• and subject to rules the defendant may set up in his answer any and all cross 
demands whatever, whether in the nature of recoupment, setoff, crossbill in equity or 
otherwise, which shall be designated counterclaims .••. " Ill. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 110, 
§44(1). 
117 " ••• and the defendant in an answer setting forth a counterclaim may join either 
as independent or as alternate claims as many claims either legal or equitable or both as 
he may have against an opposing party ..•. " Rule 18 (a), Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., 28 U.S.C. 
(1952). 
118 "The court in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice may order a sep-
arate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third party claim, or of any sep-
arate issue or any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third party claims, or 
issues." Rule 42 {b), Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., 28 U .S.C. (1952). 
119 Citations of relevant statutes and rules are collected in Appendix D. 
120 They are Alabama, Delaware, Massachusetts, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, New 
Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Virginia, Vermont and West Virginia. 
121 See Appendix A. 
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problems that might result from merger.122 Some of this opposi-
tion was justified at the time. Many problems were encountered, 
and, in time, were solved. On the other hand, many of the prob-
lems visualized by the opponents to procedural merger failed to 
materialize with the result that some jurisdictions are unduly 
denied the convenience and simplicity of modern procedure. 
For the most part, much of the needless opposition to the union 
of law and equity procedure resulted from the once understandable 
but unfortunate confusion of procedure with substance. Con-
sequently, substantive distinctions have often prevented the 
removal of simple procedural divergencies. The source of the 
confusion dates back to the formative years of English jurispru-
dence when the chancellor first began to grant his noble relief from 
the harsh rigidity of the common law forms of action. In the 
course of time, equity matured from a procedural device, acting 
only when justice and conscience so warranted, into a distinct 
court system with a well-defined body of unique substantive law. 
At this point began the agitation to merge the two courts. There 
was no apparent reason why one judge could not preside over 
both-none, that is, except the obstinate belief that the two juris-
dictions rested upon distinctions which were impossible to elim-
inate. Typical of this latter sentiment is the often quoted state-
ment of the New York Court of Appeals as it questioned the 
propriety of the single cause of action: "The inherent and funda-
mental difference between actions at law and suits in equity cannot 
be ignored. "123 
The validity of this pronouncement involves two significant 
questions. Are there in fact inherent differences between law and 
equity? And if there are, does a unified procedural system ignore 
them? A general analysis of certain areas of procedure provides 
the answers. 
Commencement of Actions 
A logical place to begin a search for inherent differences be-
tween law and equity is with an action's commencement. The 
12.2 HEPBURN, DEVELOPMENT OF CODE PLEADING 162-164 (1897); Pound, "Law and Equity 
in the Federal Courts," 73 CENT. L.J. 204 (1911); McCormick, "The Fusion of Law and 
Equity in the United States Courts," 6 N.C. L. REv. 283 (1928); Clark, "The Union of Law 
and Equity," 25 CoL. L. REv. 1 (1925); Walsh, "Merger of Law and Equity Under the 
Codes and Other Statutes," 6 N.Y. UNIV. L. REv. 157 (1929); Clark and Wright, "The 
Judicial Council and the Rule-Making Power: A Dissent and a Protest," 1 SYRACUSE L. REv. 
346 (1950). 
123 Jackson v. Strong, 222 N.Y. 149 at 154, 118 N.E. 512 (1917). 
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method by which any court must obtain personal jurisdiction over 
parties has traditionally been by service upon the defendant of 
process or notice of the action. There is no inherent difference 
between law and equity to preclude the same rule of commence-
ment from governing both. 
In Michigan, the style of process,124 persons permitted to 
serve,125 and the return of process,126 are, in fact, similarly pro-
vided for by statute and court rule. However, in present practice, 
differences do exist between law and equity procedure for com-
mencing actions in other respects. A law action may be com-
menced by issuance of an "original writ"127 or by "declaration with 
notice to plead."128 Chancery suits, on the other hand, are begun 
by filing a "bill of complaint."129 In law actions, a declaration 
must be filed within fifteen days after service of the original writ.130 
In chancery, the bill of complaint must be filed with the court 
before summons will be issued.131 In both law actions commenced 
by original writ and in chancery suits, the plaintiff may, as he 
chooses, serve a copy of the declaration or complaint on the defend-
ant along with service of the writ or summons.132 When a law 
action is commenced by declaration with notice to plead, the 
declaration must be filed at the time of commencement.133 
In addition to the above differences, court rule 13 regarding 
original writs differs from rule 14 which governs process in chan-
cery cases, in that the former rule contains special provisions as to 
the form of writs in the actions of replevin, attachment, and actions 
commenced by capias ad respondendum.134 Other than this, the 
forms included within each of the two rules differ only in that they 
reflect the distinction between the law and equity sides of the court. 
124 "The style of all process from courts of record at law and in chancery in this state 
shall be ... .'' Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §613.I. 
125 "All civil process at law, or in equity, issued from any court of record, except process 
requiring the arrest of any person, or the seizure of property, may be served by .... " Mich. 
Comp. Laws (1948) §613.22. 
126 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §613.3, provides that all original writs in personal actions 
shall be made returnable according to general rule of court. Michigan Court Rule 15 re-
garding proof of service and return of process makes no distinction between law and 
chancery process. Likewise, Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §613.38 regarding return of process 
makes no such distinction. 
127 Michigan Court Rule 13 (1945); Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §613.4. 
128 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §613.4. 
129 Michigan Court Rule 14 (1945); Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §613.5. 
180 Michigan Court Rule 27, §1 (1945); Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §613.4. 
181 Michigan Court Rule 14, §1 (1945); Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §613.5. 
132 Michigan Court Rule 13, §§7 and 14, §4 (1945); Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §613.6. 
183 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §613.4. 
134 Michigan Court Rule 13, §§4, 5, and 6 (1945), respectively. 
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A significant difference in the range of process between law 
and chancery now exists in Michigan.135 The severe consequences 
stemming from this difference have been previously discussed.136 
The fundamental purpose of these provisions is identical. 
Arbitrary distinctions in name and formal detail are wholly super-
fluous and capable of elimination. It is submitted, then, that a 
single court rule for the commencement of civil actions, whether 
they are legal or equitable in nature, is possible as well as practi-
cable. Certain actions in rem, property seizures, and arrests of 
the person are matters entirely apart from personal jurisdiction, 
and may entail special process or service by publication. How-
ever, there is no reason why they may not be commenced as civil 
actions and thus be subject to ordinary rules of commencement as 
far as applicable. Special provisions regarding such actions, may, 
when necessary, be based on distinctions other than that between 
law and equity. 
Parties to Actions and ]oinder of Parties 
The framers of the first New York code reported: 
"The rules respecting parties in courts of law, differ from 
those in the courts of equity. The blending of jurisdictions 
makes it necessary to revise these rules, to some extent. In 
doing so, we have a three-fold purpose in view: first, to do 
away with artificial distinctions existing in the courts of law, 
and to require the real party in interest to appear in court as 
such: ... The true rule undoubtedly is, that which prevails 
in the courts of equity, that he who has the right, is the person 
to pursue the remedy. We have adopted that rule."137 
Michigan also adopted that rule as part of the Judicature Act of 
1915.138 By doing so, an equitable rule of procedure was made 
applicable in law courts, for by its terms, the provision applies to 
"every action." A complete blending of law and equity procedure 
at the present time would not involve the question of who is the 
real party in interest, because, by continuous construction of the 
135 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §613.27. The text of the statute is set out note 52 supra. 
136 Under heading Transfer of Actions Between Sides, supra. 
137Fmsr REPORT OF CoMMISSIONERS ON PRACfICE AND PLEADING (New York) 123-124 
(1848). . 
138 "Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest, but an 
executor, administrator, guardian, trustee of an express trust, a party with whom or in 
whose name a contract has been made for the benefit of another, or a party expressly au-
thorized by statute, may sue in his own name without joining with him the party for whose 
benefit the action is brought ... .'' Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §612.2. 
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statute smce 1915, there is already a substantial body of case 
authority available. The real party in interest under present 
procedure would likewise be the real party in interest under 
merged procedure.139 _ 
The law concerning joinder of plaintiffs was liberalized by 
the Judicature Act of 1915. Prior to that time, only plaintiffs with 
joint causes of action could join in one action at law.140 In equity, 
each plaintiff had to have a "community of interest" and had to 
seek the same relief before joinder was allowed.141 The statutory 
provision introduced by the act added the "convenient administra-
tion of justice" as a ground for joinder of plaintiffs.142 It applied 
both to actions at law and suits in equity.143 Since the present 
rule of convenience applies to either type of action, there would 
be no change if it were to apply to a "civil action." Furthermore, 
though it is not the purpose of this discussion to treat the con-
struction given to the Michigan rule,144 it may be said that a merger 
of law and equity would facilitate subsequent application of the 
rule of convenience. The recent trend in most American jurisdic-
tions is toward the free joinder of plaintiffs whenever conven-
ient.145 If both legal and equitable claims could be joined in one 
action, many more situations would arise in which it would be 
convenient to allow plaintiffs to join their separate claims, some 
of which may be legal and some equitable. 
130 See substantially similar provision of rule 17 (a), Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., 28 U.S.C. 
(1952). 
140 Rogers v. Raynor, 102 Mich. 473, 60 N.W. 980 (1894). 
141 Hamilton v. American Hulled Bean Co., 143 Mich. 277, 106 N.W. 731 (1906). 
142 "The plaintiff may join in one action, at law or in equity, as many causes of action 
as he may have against the defendant, but legal and equitable causes of action shall not be 
joined; but when there is more than one plaintiff, the causes of action joined must be 
joint, and if there be more than one defendant, the liability must be one asserted against 
all of the material defendants, or sufficient grounds must appear for uniting the causes 
of action in order to promote the convenient administration of justice .•.. " Mich. Comp. 
Laws (1948) §608.1. 
143 Gilmer v. Miller, 319 Mich. 136, 29 N.W. (2d) 264 (1947). 
144 See Bajorek v. Kurtz, 335 Mich. 58, 55 N.W. (2d) 727 (1952), noted in 51 MICH. 
L. REv. 1068 (1953). See also, 14 DETROIT LAWYER 228 (1946). 
145 Blume, "Free Joinder of Parties, Claims, and Counterclaims," 2 F.R.D. 250 (1941). 
The federal rules allow joinder based upon convenience, viz., "All persons may join in one 
action as plaintiffs if they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative 
in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or 
occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all of them will arise in the 
action. All persons may be joined in one action as defendants if there is asserted against 
them jointly, severally, or in the alternative, any right to relief in respect of or arising 
out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any 
question of law or fact common to all of them will arise in the action. A plaintiff or de-
fendant need not be interested in obtaining or defending against all the relief de-
manded •••• " Rule 20(a), Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., 28 U.S.C. (1952). 
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Pleading 
Pleading is a matter of court administration, a means to an 
end. While the relief sought in a particular action may well in-
volve inherent substantive characteristics peculiar to itself, the 
pleading, which is no more than a device to aid in the quest for 
such relief, need not bear a similar distinction. No matter what the 
action, one purpose of all pleadings is to inform the opposite party 
and the court of the claim for which it stands, a concept early an-
nounced by the Michigan Supreme Court.146 Moreover, general 
pleading requirements have been conspicuously influenced by the 
common sense liberality of equity procedure.147 Less attention 
is being given to matters of technical form. 
At the present time, matters of form and mechanics in respect 
to pleadings on either side of Michigan's courts are, for the most 
part, commonly prescribed by court rule.148 Court rules 19 and 
21 supposedly differentiat~ the form and content of declarations at 
law from bills in equity. However, the only distinction between 
the two is the requirement that causes of action at law are to be 
designated "counts" and those in equity "divisions." Neither 
rule contains an exclusive provision not contained in the other, 
and the two could well be combined if only for the purpose of re-
moving duplication. 
Apart from the court rules above discussed, there remains by 
statute a significant vestige of pleading duality regarding the 
classification of actions at law. Assumpsit, trespass on the case, 
replevin, and ejectment have been preserved as forms of action 
into which a pleader must fit his case.149 The technical distinc-
tions among these several forms, once so stringently regarded, have 
now been rendered of no purpose and, in view of modern pleading 
theory, might well be abolished entirely. Such was the view of 
146 "Pleadings are required for the purpose of apprising the opposite party and the 
court of matters upon which the pleader relies, and to which the evidence is to be directed; 
and they are generally sufficient when they fully accomplish this purpose." Cooley, J., 
People ex rel. Benoit v. Miller, 15 Mich. 354 at 357 (1867). For similar statements as to 
declarations in particular see Merkle v. Township of Bennington, 68 Mich. 133, 35 N.W. 
846 (1888); and as to chancery pleadings, Anderson v. Mollitor, 223 Mich. 159, 193 N.W. 
851 (1923). Blume, "Theory of Pleading," 47 MICH. L. REv. 297 (1949). 
147 See Michigan Court Rules 17 and 23 generally. Most of the provisions contained 
therein originated in early equity practice. See generally MAITLAND, EQUITY (1910). 
148 Caption, Rule 7; General Rules of Pleading, Rule 17; Answer and Reply, Rules 
23-24; Amendment of Pleadings, Rules 25-26; Filing, Rule 27. 
149 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §6II.1. 
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the New York commissioners as early as 1848.150 The Judicature 
Act of 1915 had reduced the number of these forms in Michigan 
to the four mentioned above. The reason why all were not 
abolished was stated by Professor Sunderland in his comment on 
the act: 
"The attempted retention of assumpsit and case was doubt-
less a concession to the prejudice of a conservative profession. 
There has always been a strong antipathy among lawyers of 
this State to Code Pleading, and nothing which too clearly 
resembled that much distrusted system could have passed the 
legislature. 'Assumpsit' and 'trespass on the case' sounded 
entirely orthodox and respectable, and exorcised the bogy 
of a 'Code' defection."151 
Therefore, in view of these considerations, it is submitted that 
the four remaining ordinary forms of action be abolished in order 
to complete the process of simplification already begun by the 
1915 act. Indeed, the distinctions between actions themselves 
cannot be removed if the distinctions between their forms are not 
also abolished. 
It should be noted that in addition to the ordinary forms of 
action, the Judicature Act also preserves the extraordinary actions 
of certiorari, mandamus, and quo warranto.152 However, these 
actions, together with other special proceedings such as habeas 
corpus, divorce, and appeals from administrative boards and com-
missions are matters requiring special provisions because of the 
inherent distinctions which they involve. Such distinctions, how-
ever, are not based upon differences between law and equity. The 
unification of procedure would in no way prevent special provision 
from governing these areas of extraordinary procedure. 
150 "From the period of which we have been speaking-a period comparatively be-
nighted and ignorant, in all that is valuable in science-to the present, these forms have 
been adhered to with a sort of bigoted devotion. While the principles of legal science have 
expanded and adapted themselves to the exigencies of each successive age, through which 
they have passed, we find ourselves met with the standing argument against improvement, 
that the time honored institutions of ages must be held sacred, and that these forms, which 
may have been well suited to the age in which they originated, must be left untouched. Is 
there, in truth, any soundness in such a doctrine? Can it be possible, that the progress 
which has characterized almost every age since that period, and which is the distinguishing 
feature of the present day, must stop in its application to the machinery by which rights 
are to be vindicated and wrongs redressed?" FIRST REPORT OF COMMISSIONERS ON PRACTICE 
AND PLEADING (New York) 87 (1848). 
15114 M1CH. L. R.Ev. 383 at 385 (1916). 
152 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §611.1. 
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Nature of Relief 
A fundamental distinction between law and equity exists with 
respect to the nature of relief historically obtainable within each.153 
As a general proposition, courts of law render judgments for money 
damages, or for recovery of specific real and personal property. 
Equity has power, in certain cases to award specific relief of many 
kinds. It is most clear that there is differentiation and demarca-
tion between legal and equitable remedies. The differences in-
volved are differences of substantive law which concern the exist-
ence of rights and remedies available. 
The goal of procedural merger is to provide a single unified 
procedure for the purpose of invoking the appropriate legal and 
equitable remedy, depending only upon the substantive differ-
ences. The precise nature and extent of substantive distinctions 
between legal and equitable remedies is immaterial from this point 
of view, since merger does not affect substantive law. This prin-
ciple of the scope of merger has often been stated by federal courts, 
which, since 1938, have operated under a single form of action 
and a complete joinder of law and equity procedure. For example, 
Judge Holtzoff for the District Court of the District of Columbia 
has stated: 
"The distinction between equitable and legal rights, and 
between equitable and legal remedies, still exists in the Fed-
eral courts in full force. While the new Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure ... have done away with the separation between 
actions at law and suits in equity, and have substituted one 
form of action, known as 'civil action', this merger does not 
reach beyond an abolition of procedural distinctions between 
law and equity. This differentiation between equitable and 
legal doctrines, and between equitable and legal remedies, 
is part of the warp and woof of Anglo-American jurisprudence 
and is deeply embedded in our system of law. It has not been 
abrogated or affected by the commendable simplification of 
procedure. Consequently, in determining whether an in-
junction should be granted, the basic doctrines of equity come 
in to play."154 
And in the District Court for New Jersey, the following is a state-
ment by Judge Smith: 
"The Rules of Civil Procedure established a uniform sys-
153 POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES, 5th ed., 14 (1941). 
154 Byram v. Vaughn, (D.C. D.C. 1946) 68 F. Supp. 981 at 984. 
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tem of procedure for law and equity and eliminated only the 
formal distinction. The 'civil action' is a mere procedural 
unit and the joinder, as in this case, of legal and equitable 
causes of action, which the rules permit, does not require or 
even warrant their being considered as a unit for purpose of 
trial. While the rules affect a unity of procedure they do not 
effect a merger of remedies. Legal and equitable remedies, 
while they may be administered in the same proceeding, must 
be administered separately as heretofore. It is not intended 
that the remedies shall be either jointly or interchangeably 
administered at the will or demand of the litigants. The rights 
and remedies of the respective parties remain unaffected."155 
Right to Jury Trial 
By far the most significant difference between trials at law and 
those in chancery involves the right to trial by jury. The distinc-
tion is fundamental; and is made so by the constitutional guarantee 
that the right to jury trial shall remain.156 This means that it 
must remain as it was at common law when the constitution was 
adopted, a right then cognizable at law but not available in chan-
cery.157 How then, is it possible to preserve this right if the dis-
tinction between actions at law and suits in chancery is abolished? 
Every combined court jurisdiction has faced this question, for a 
similar constitutional guarantee is common to all of them.158 
First of all, it is necessary to determine the nature of the right 
to jury. At common law the jury right was cognizable in law cases, 
but there was no right to have a jury try the entire case. Only the 
issues or questions of fact which comprised a case at law were the 
proper subject of jury determination, while the judge determined 
the issues or questions of law.159 So it may be said that the jury 
right preserved by the constitution was a right to have questions 
of fact on legal issues tried by a jury. Therefore, the distinction 
between actions at law and suits in equity can be abolished if the 
fundamental right to a jury method of trial can be preserved on 
155 Fitzpatrick v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada, (D.C. N.J. 1941) 1 F.R.D. 713 at 715. 
156 "The right of trial by jury shall remain, but shall be deemed to be waived in all 
civil cases unless demanded by one of the parties in such manner as shall be prescribed 
by law." MICH. CoNsr., art. II, §13. 
157 Bielby v. Allender, 330 Mich. 12, 46 N.W. (2d) 445 (1951); Swart v. Kimball, 41 
Mich. 443, 5 N.W. 645 (1880). 
158 BLUME, AMERICAN CIVIL PROCEDURE §9.01 (1955); Colorado has no constitutional 
right to jury in civil cases. Cow. CoNsr., art. II, §23. 
159 Peoples Wayne County Bank v. Wolverine Box Co., 250 Mich. 273, 230 N.W. 170 
(1930). 
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each and every fact issue where that right presently exists on the 
law side of the court. In other words, all other distinctions be-
tween actions can be eliminated, if the distinction between fact 
issues is kept, thus allowing fact issues in what are presently law 
actions to be tried to the jury when demanded. Survey of those 
jurisdictions already employing a combined procedure shows that 
the jury right is preserved by one of three general types of statutes. 
The oldest of the three is the Field-type statute. In New York 
and those jurisdictions with similar provisions, the legal or equi-
table character of the fact issues does not determine the right to 
jury trial of those issues. Rather, there has been an attempt to 
classify "actions" in which a jury determination of fact can be 
had. Thus a demand for jury must be granted in the following 
instances: 
"l. An action in which the·complaint demands judgment 
for a sum of money only. 
2. An action of ejectment; for dower; for waste; for a 
nuisance; to recover a chattel; or for determination of a claim 
to real property under article fifteen of the real property 
law."100 , 
The intention of the creators of this provision was to modify 
the common law right to jury by making the right applicable to 
both legal and equitable actions involving the subject matter enu-
merated.161 In this way, they thought, the jury right would be 
preserved-in fact expanded-while the distinction between law 
and equity would be abolished. But the New York courts have 
held this statute to be declaratory of the common law thereby 
refusing to implement the intended expansion of the jury right.162 
This resulted in the application of a historical test whenever a 
jury was demanded in one of the enumerated actions, so that it 
could be determined whether the right to jury had ever existed in 
that kind of action at common law, i.e., was the action legal or 
equitable in nature? The ,consequences of this approach to the 
160 N.Y. Civil Practice Act (Cahill-Parsons, 1955) §425. 
161 FIRST REPORT OF COMMISSIONERS ON PRACTICE AND PLEADING (New York) 176-185 
(1848). 
102 See Kharas, "A Century of Law-Equity Merger in New York," I SYRACUSE L. REv. 
186 (1949). The author cites New York cases to show that, in spite of the statute, there is 
no jury right in an action in the nature of a creditor's bill even though it is for a money 
judgment only, nor in an equitable action to redeem a chattel, nor in an action to enjoin 
a continuing nuisance, nor in a fraud action to recover the value for an inchoate dower 
right. 
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jury problem in New York procedure have been widely attacked.168 
When legal and equitable issues are joined in the same action, as 
the New York code allows them to be, the decisions have resulted 
in all sorts of anomalies and narrow distinctions regarding when a 
jury may decide the fact issues. In vigorous opposition to the 
New York approach, Judge Clark summarized: 
". . . [T]he assumed rigidity between actions at law and 
suits in equity has led to a fundamentally erroneous approach 
to the question of the form of trial now appropriate in New 
York. It is still assumed that a case is either one all at law 
or all in equity, instead of the more correct approach, as shown 
by the code practice generally, that it is the form of separate 
issues which determines the jury-trial right."164 
Thus when a case is considered all law or all equity, as it is in 
New York, the historical law-equity dichotomy is resurrected-a 
result which the statute was designed and intended to avoid in the 
first place. The criticism of the Field-type statute and the result 
obtained under it in New York is considered valid. 
An improvement is found in the second type of provision, 
which governs the jury right in Connecticut. This type of statute 
is basically more effective in preserving the right to jury, as history 
has defined it, by granting jury demands in ". . . civil actions 
involving such an issue of fact as, prior to January 1, 1880, would 
not present a question properly cognizable in equity."165 
By this provision, a clear-cut test is provided, and a rational 
historical investigation becomes necessary, a result which preserves 
the original constitutional right to jury without replacing it with 
a new one. Even more significantly, this statute narrows the 
determinative unit to the "issue" involved, thus avoiding the 
pleading entrapment inherent in characterization of actions as all-
legal or all-equitable under the Field-type statute. 
However, because of the peculiar language of the Connecticut 
statute, there is possibility that the constitutional right to jury may 
168 Clark, "The Union of Law and Equity," 25 Cot. L. REv. 1 (1925); note, 55 YALE 
L.J. 826 (1946); Kharas, "A Century of Law-Equity Merger in New York," I SYRACUSE 
L. REv. 186 (1949); Clark and Wright, "The Judicial Council and the Rule-Making Power: 
A Dissent and a Protest," 1 SYRACUSE L. REv. 346 at 354 (1950); Clark, "Trial of Actions 
Under the Code," 11 CoRN. L.Q. 482 (1926); Rothschild, "New York Civil Practice Sim-
plified," 26 Cot. L. REv. 30 (1926); McK.enna, "Trial by Jury Under the Federal Rules," 
29 GEO. L.J. 88 (1940). 
164 Clark and Wright, "The Judicial Council and the Rule-Making Power: A Dissent 
and a Protest," I SYRACUSE L. REv. 346 at 354 (1950). 
165 Conn. Gen. Stat. (1949) §7936. 
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be enlarged upon. A new right of action created by statute after 
January I, 1880 would fall outside that class which "would not 
present a question properly cognizable in equity" before that date 
and, therefore, subsequently-created actions would apparently be 
triable to a jury. States with this type of jury statute have so 
held.166 It would seem unwise for a state to adopt such a statute. 
A previous attempt by the Michigan legislature to extend jury 
trials to cases in equity has, in fact, been held unconstitutional.167 
The federal rules provide: "The right to trial by jury as de-
clared by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution or as given 
by a statute of the United States shall be preserved to the parties 
inviolate."168 
The former character of each issue involved in a civil action 
is made, by this provision, the determinative unit upon which the 
court must base its ruling whenever a demand for jury is made. 
The right to jury is preserved as of the time the Constitution was 
adopted, just as the framers intended it to be; and enlargement 
and diminution if any, will not by implication be inferred from 
any definition of the right to jury. 
Of the three types of jury provisions-Field, Connecticut, and 
Federal-the last is the only one which preserves the jury right 
under combined procedure exactly as it was when separate courts 
existed. Therefore, it is submitted that federal rules 38 and 39 
should serve as models for the preservation of the jury right in 
any ·new amalgamated procedure. The provision of federal rule 
38 (a), if made referable to the state constitution, would involve 
a historical consideration of constitutional right whenever a jury 
is demanded. This proces~ would be the same as is now re-
quired when a Michigan court is requested to rule on a motion 
to transfer a claim to the opposite side of the court, for in such an 
event a historical investigation of the nature of the claim must now 
be made. The adoption of the jury demand and waiver provisions 
as contained in federal rule 38 would not change existing Michigan 
jury right,169 nor would federal rule 39 alter existing provisions for 
advisory juries in chancery.110 
166 Standard Co. v. Young, 90 Conn. 133, 96 A. 932 (1916); Trittipo v. Morgan, 99 Ind. 
269 (1884); Lamb v. Lamb, 105 Ind. 456, 5 N.E. 171 (1885). 
167 Brown v. Kalamazoo Circuit Judge, 75 Mich. 274, 42 N.W. 827 (1889). 
168 Rule 38, Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., 28 U.S.C. (1952). 
169 MICH. CONST., art II, §13; Michigan Court Rule 33 (1945); Mich. Comp. Laws 
(1948) §615.12. 
170 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §§618.12 and 618.21. 
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Judicial Marshaling of the Trial 
Once the two sides of the court have been combined by means 
of provisions preserving the right to jury trial, the next considera-
tion is one of marshaling the trial in cases embracing both legal 
and equitable issues.171 A jury once impaneled cannot be made 
to wait idly by for long periods while the court determines matters 
of equitable nature. It is likewise inexpedient for the court to 
launch into complex equitable considerations when a jury deter-
mination of a basic legal issue would preclude the use of equity. 
So practical necessity requires the court to fix the order of trial at 
an early stage so that the legal issues involved in the action may 
be tried at a time when the jury is in the box. Such a determina-
tion by the court, made after the court has notice of all the claims 
asserted, in all probability will result in a more intelligent and 
expedient trial of claims. No longer will the order of trial be 
determined by the fortuitous circumstance of which claim first 
reaches the trial calendar. 
Consideration should be given to the frequency of situations 
in which a demand for jury might possibly complicate the marshal-
ing of trials under blended procedure. Most cases are tried to 
the judge. For example, in 1954 there were 7,458 civil actions 
tried in Michigan courts.172 Juries were impaneled in 646 of the 
cases docketed on the law side of the court. Therefore, in that 
year, Michigan judges ordered a jury impaneled in but 8.6 percent 
of the cases actually tried. In the four years preceding 1954, the 
number of times juries were impaneled has not exceeded 9 percent 
of the total cases tried in any one year. 
In civil actions comprising issues all-legal or all-equitable, there 
is no problem as to which of the issues are to be tried to jury and 
which to the court. If Michigan were to merge law and equity 
procedure, most civil actions would fall into this classification 
because of the large volume of automobile negligence and divorce 
cases now appearing on court dockets. Rarely would such cases 
entail a joinder of legal and equitable issues. When legal and 
equitable issues do become joined in a single action, it has been 
171 See Morris, "Jury Trial Under the Federal Fusion of Law and Equity," 20 TEX. 
L. R.Ev. 427 (1942); Pike and Fischer, "Pleadings and Jury Rights in the New Federal 
Procedure," 88 UNIV. PA. L. R.Ev. 645 (1940); McCaskill, "Jury Demands in the New Fed-
eral Procedure,'' 88 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 315 (1940); James, "Trial by Jury and the New Fed-
eral Rules of Procedure,'' 45 YALE L.J. 1022 (1936). 
172 Twenty-first-Twenty-fifth Annual Report of the Judicial Council of Michigan 
(1950-1954). Includes cases in all circuit courts and the superior court in Grand Rapids. 
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said that no complications arise unless "(a) one party will desire 
a trial by jury, (b) the other party will not, and (c) the court 
cannot decide fairly between them. Unless all three conditions 
exist there is no difficulty."173 
In considering the effect of procedural merger on the method 
of trial, it is important to distinguish the constitutional right to 
jury, which the courts are charged to preserve as a matter of funda-
mental law,174 from the judicial discretion involved in marshal-
ing the trial in order to obtain a sensible presentation of the issues 
in dispute. Regarding the latter, the court must be given wide 
latitude to determine the sequence of issues to be tried so that 
convenient trial methods and efficient use of jury time may result. 
But because the jury right must be constitutionally preserved, a 
court must be denied the ability to modify it through unlimited 
exercise of judicial discretion. To this end, the following addi-
tion to federal rule 39 is suggested: 
( c) Sequence of Trial. When certain of the issues are to 
be tried by jury and others by the court, or when a number 
of claims, cross-claims, defenses, counterclaims, or third-party 
claims involve a common issue, the court may determine the 
sequence in which such issues are to be tried, preserving at 
all times the constitutional right to trial by jury according to 
the basic nature of every issue to which a demand for jury as 
provided by rule has been served and filed. 
Separate Law and Equity Issues Arising From Concurrent Claims 
When certain issues relate only to an equitable claim, and 
others relate only to a legal claim, there is little difficulty in ascer-
taining which of the issues are to be tried by jury and which to 
the court. When a plaintiff joins a claim for specific performance 
with a separate claim for damages for breach of contract, it is clear 
that a jury may be demanded to determine the amount of damages, 
while only the court may try fact issues bearing upon the right to 
specific performance. But if the damages sought are incidental 
to the equitable relief, the court may decree specific performance 
and then proceed to , determine the amount of incidental relief 
without a jury.175 When specific relief is denied a plaintiff claim-
173 CLARK, CODE PLEADING, 2d ed., §16 (1947). 
174 See Right to Jury Trial, supra. 
175 There is no right to jury determination of the amount of incidental damages under 
present law, since equity has the power to render money judgments so as to grant full 
relief. See Flanagan v. Harder, 270 Mich. 288, 258 N.W. 633 (1935); Latimer v. Piper, 
261 Mich. 123, 246 N.W. 65 (1933). 
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ing both specific performance and incidental damages, the plain-
tiff can amend to claim damages in lieu of specific performance. 
Both parties may then demand a jury since all the issues would 
be legal in nature.176 When a defendant to an action for specific 
performance counterclaims for damages, both parties could de-
mand a jury to fix the amount of damages in the event the defend-
ant prevailed, while a counterclaim for equitable relief would not 
alter the parties' right to jury on the plaintiff's successful claim 
for damages.177 
Thus, whenever legal and equitable claims are joined in such 
manner that both kinds of relief are sought, and each issue in dis-
pute relates exclusively to one claim or the other, the court can 
order the issues tried in any manner convenient without fear of 
depriving the parties of the right to a jury trial. In all probability, 
the situations above outlined would be most conveniently disposed 
of if the court were to try all the issues except the amount of dam-
ages, and then at the conclusion of the trial, impanel a jury to fix 
the amount of damages if any were found to be recoverable. How-
ever, the court has discretion to determine and order the most con-
venient sequence of trial in light of the exigencies of the particular 
case before it. 
Separate Law and Equity Issues Arising From Alternative Claims 
Present Michigan practice allows parties to plead alternative 
claims or defenses.178 Under merged procedure this would mean that 
a plaintiff could seek equitable relief, such as specific performance, 
or, in the alternative, legal relief, such as damages for breach of 
contract. Unlike the above situations where both kinds of relief 
are desired, the jury right will depend entirely upon which of the 
alternate claims, if either, the court decrees. The results obtained 
under a divided system, indicate that both parties have the right 
to a jury in regard to the damage claim and neither party has such a 
176 Under present Michigan practice, a denial of equitable relief requires plaintiff, 
if he wishes to continue, to transfer his cause to the law side of the court, unless it appears 
that the plaintiff acted in good faith and would have been entitled to equitable relief but 
for some act of the defendant making such relief impossible. "\Visper v. Dix-Ferndale 
Land Co., 241 Mich. 91, 216 N.W. 393 (1927). That a plaintiff cannot deprive defendant 
of a right to jury trial by alleging unfounded grounds for equitable relief, see Michigan 
Bean Co. v. Burrell Engineering and Construction Co., 306 Mich. 420, 11 N.W. (2d) 
12 (1943). 
177Under present practice, the damage claim would be tried on the law side of the 
court no matter which party claimed damages. In any case where the right to damages 
prevailed over a claim for equitable relief by the opposite party, the amount of damages 
could be tried by jury just as any legal claim. 
178 Michigan Court Rule 17 (1945). 
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right in regard to the specific performance claim. The plaintiff has 
complete power to control the trial by jury in that he may choose 
his remedy, and thus the method of trial, while the defendant has 
a jury right only if the legal remedy is sought. The problem of 
marshaling the trial, then, is one of trying both of the alternative 
claims in the most convenient way while preserving the currently 
recognized right to jury trial. Separate trials of the facts relative to 
each claim may prove costly in terms of time and effort. If a jury 
is impaneled and specific performance is decreed, the jury's pres-
ence was unnecessary. 
This problem was well handled in Ford v. C. E. Wilson & 
Co.179 by Judge Hinks of the District Court of Connecticut. In 
that case the plaintiff alleged a sale and delivery of merchandise 
for which no payment had been received. The remedy sought was 
damages. Alternatively, the plaintiff alleged facts constituting in-
terference with contract based upon misrepresentation and fraud 
by the co-defendant bank, and prayed that certain assignments 
be set aside and a constructive trust declared. If the plaintiff re-
covered from the defendant on the alleged contract there would 
be no recovery from co-defendant bank. After holding the first 
count was a claim for damages based on breach of contract, and 
the second count was a claim for fraud involving both legal and 
equitable issues, the court disposed of the sequence of trial as 
follows: 
". . . I rule that all issues which are common to the legal 
causes of action (in either count) and to the equitable cause 
stated in the second count shall be tried together, the legal 
issues, of course, to the jury and the equitable issues to the 
court; and that all equitable issues which do not pertain to the 
legal causes shall be tried to the court immediately follow-
ing the jury trial. 
"This ruling will have practical application as follows: 
On the day of trial ... the parties will proceed precisely as 
though trying to the jury both the first count and the second 
count viewed as charging actionable fraud, and the rulings on 
the evidence will be made as though no other issues were be-
fore the court. The court, however, will accept all evidence 
which is received in the jury trial for any proper bearing it 
may have upon the second count viewed as a cause of action 
in equity. After the jury has been charged and has retired to 
deliberate, the court will proceed to hear additional evidence 
179 (D.C. Conn. 1939) 30 F. Supp. 163. 
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on the equitable cause stated in the second count. There will 
be neither need nor permission to reiterate evidence already 
received in the jury trial; but any evidence theretofore offered 
and excluded in the jury trial may again be offered for its 
bearing on the second count viewed as a cause of action in 
equity. 
"The presiding judge will of course have discretion to 
await the verdict of the jury before embarking upon a further 
hearing of evidence on the equitable issues. As we have seen, 
a verdict against the Bank might make it unnecessary to de-
cide the equitable issues. However, the parties should be in 
readiness to proceed forthwith when the jury retires. For a 
defendant's verdict would apparently still leave open equitable 
issues, and the judge may feel it better to take any additional 
evidence thereon forthwith, while the parties and witnesses 
are in attendance, rather than to wait for the verdict of the 
jury.''180 
The Ford case dealt with the legal claim before it considered 
the equitable claim. When a plaintiff prefers specific performance, 
and wants damages only in the event that the equitable relief is 
denied, a question arises as to plaintiff's right to a jury trial on 
the legal claims when because of failure of the equitable claims 
only the legal claims are left. It is the position of Professor Moore, 
in his original treatise,181 that whenever a plaintiff, in his pleading, 
sets forth his equitable claim before his alternative claim for 
damages, the right to jury on the damage claim is waived, although 
the waiver does not affect defendant's jury rights. In applying 
the doctrine of waiver, as a rule of thumb, a plaintiff who in reality 
prefers equitable relief, but who also wants a jury if he cannot 
obtain equitable relief, is deprived of a jury trial of the legal claim. 
It has been suggested that this deprivation is a violation of con-
stitutional right to jury.182 This suggestion would appear valid 
under the present Michigan practice in which a plaintiff cannot 
plead legal and equitable claims in the alternative. A plaintiff who 
commences an action on the chancery side of the court and finds 
his claim fails because of an equitable weakness must permit the 
action to be transferred to the law side of the court in order to 
180 Id. at 165-166. 
181 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 3018 (1938). See also Pike and Fischer, "Pleadings and 
Jury Rights in the New Federal Procedure," 88 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 315 (1940). 
182 See Morris, "Jury Trial Under the New Federal Fusion of Law and Equity," 20 
Tmc. L. REv. 4Zl (1942); Fraser v. Geist, (E.D. Pa. 1940) l F.R.D. 267. 
1098 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55 
obtain any alternative legal relief.183 In the recent case of Christian 
v. Porter,184 the Michigan court construed the effect of such trans-
fer upon the jury rights of the parties. The trial court denied a 
motion to transfer the case from equity to law and, after so ruling, 
proceeded to decree damages to plaintiff. Although the plaintiff 
was not demanding a jury trial, on appeal the court quoted with 
approval from an earlier decision185 construing the transfer statute 
as follows: 
" 'The right of trial by jury is secured to plaintiff by the 
Constitution of this State. Article 2, §13. This statute in no 
way attempts to deprive the plaintiff of such right, nor should 
such a construction be given it as would even tend to work out 
such a result in violation of the constitutional provision.' "186 
Thus it was held that the transfer provision did not alter the right 
to jury trial under the previous procedure, wherein a plaintiff was 
allowed to commence a new action at law upon dismissal of his 
cause of action in equity. It is submitted that the constitutional 
provision would be violated if a plaintiff were forced to waive his 
right to jury by the mere fact that he pleaded his defective equi-
table claim for relief before his alternative claim for legal relief. 
The constitutional question is acknowledged in the second 
edition of Moore's treatise.187 It is there stated that the federal 
rules allow a plaintiff the freedom to join legal and equitable 
claims in the alternative, which under the former practice was 
not possible. And further, "Whether this advantage warrants 
applying the rule of the thumb stated in the [original] Treatise 
or whether plaintiff is entitled to the more tender rule . . . is 
largely a question of values." 
In view of the present law in Michigan, it would seem that this 
question of values must be resolved in favor of preserving to plaintiff 
his right to jury trial of the legal issues after his preferred equi-
table remedy has failed. This can be done, as is suggested in the 
Treatise, by requiring the plaintiff to amend his complaint to 
eliminate any pleading of an equitable claim after the court has 
183 See Transfer of Actions Between Sides, supra. 
184 340 Mich. 300, 65 N.W. (2d) 779 (1954). 
185 Lake Superior Brass Foundry Co. v. Houghton Circuit Judge, 209 Mich. 380 at 383, 
176 N.W. 409 (1920). 
186 340 Mich. 300 at 303. 
187 5 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, 2d ed., 158-162 (1951). 
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ruled that no equitable remedy is available.188 However, amend-
ment destroys the advantage of alternative pleading. The right 
to jury should not be made to turn upon the technical form of the 
pleading. If the distinction between the right to jury trial and 
the judicial discretion to marshal the trial is kept in mind, there 
is no dilemma. The simultaneous trial of both the legal and equi-
table issues, as was done in the Ford case, may be the practical 
solution and the trial judge may use his discretion to adapt this 
procedure to fit the circumstances of the case before him. But, 
as was previously pointed out, an equitable decree may result in 
the jury being called unnecessarily. Such a result will not occur 
if the judge exercises his discretion wisely. Whenever a plaintiff 
pleads alternatively, and demands a jury trial on the legal issues, 
the court can require him to state which of the alternative remedies 
he prefers. If the plaintiff prefers the damage remedy, a jury 
should be called at the beginning of the trial, and the issues tried 
as if no others were before the court. A verdict for plaintiff will 
end the case. An adverse verdict will permit the court to dismiss 
the jury; and if there exist any grounds for the alternative equi-
table remedy, the court may proceed to consider those issues not 
tried previously to the jury. If the plaintiff prefers specific per-
formance, but wants a jury trial in the event he loses on the equity 
claim, the court can order the equitable issues tried first to the 
court. From the fact that he has pleaded alternatively, it is appar-
ent that the plaintiff has doubts in regard to the strength of his 
preferred equitable claim. When the issues are being framed at 
pre-trial, the court, with full perspective of all the issues to be 
tried, can order the doubtful equitable issues to be tried first, just 
as the court sitting in equity now tests the strength of a bill 
of complaint in order to determine whether a plaintiff has stated 
a cause of action in equity. At trial, if these issues are resolved in 
the plaintiff's favor, there will be no need to call a jury. If they 
show that plaintiff is not entitled to equitable relief, a jury may 
then be impaneled to try the legal issues. It may even be that the 
court will as a matter of discretion decide to take proof on both 
issues at the same time. When a plaintiff fails to cooperate in 
188 After an excellent discussion of the question, the author concludes, "With defer-
ence, we believe, however, that until the plaintiff amends his complaint to strip it of his 
fust demand for equitable relief, he must be held to be pressing for that relief, and he 
(plaintiff) is not entitled to demand jury trial. And we believe that the weight of authority 
is in accord." Id., p. 162. 
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stating his preferred remedy so that the court has no guide as to 
how the trial ought to be marshaled, it is not unfair, in that case, 
to rule that the plaintiff has waived his right to jury. He should 
not, however, be forced to waive the jury just because he prefers 
the equitable remedy. 
Issues Common to Law and Equity Claims 
When legal and equitable claims are joined, the issues involved 
may not be all legal or all equitable in every case.189 It is possible, 
in view of such joinder, that certain issues will be common to both 
claims. The question arises as to which claim the court should 
try first, since the original ruling on the common issue will be the 
law of the case. Whether that issue is tried to the court or to the 
jury will depend on whether the court orders the equitable or the 
legal claim tried first.190 
In the federal case of Orenstein v. United States,191 there 
existed an issue common to the legal and equitable claims that had 
been joined. Plaintiff had commenced a suit for treble damages 
joined with a claim for injunction against future overcharge under 
the Rent Control Act. The court treated the treble damage claim 
as legal in nature, and a jury right existed to determine the amount 
of damages. The issue of whether there was, in fact, an overcharge 
was an issue common to the damage claim and the claim for in-
junction. The opinion stated that the court has discretion to try 
the equitable claim first, and any determination of the issues in-
volved in that claim would be binding on the defendant, and could 
not be relitigated in the jury trial for treble damages. 
A contrary view was expressed in the Eighth Circuit, in Leimer 
v. W oods,192 which involved substantially the same fact situation. 
Upon review of the trial court's denial of trial by jury, the court 
stated: 
"In summary, a federal court may not under the Rules of 
Civil Procedure, in a situation of joined or consolidated equi-
table and legal causes of action, involving a common substan-
tial question of fact, deprive either party of a properly de-
189 Id., pp. 148-158. 
190 BLUME, AMERICAN CIVIL PROCEDURE 373-390 (1955), wherein the author classifies 
the various cases according to the relief sought, and sets forth the method of trial necessary 
in each to preserve the right to jury. 
101 (1st Cir. 1951) 191 F. (2d) 184. 
102 (8th Cir. 1952) 196 F. (2d) 828. 
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mantled jury trial upon that question, by proceeding to a 
previous disposition of the equitable cause of action and so 
causing the fact to become res judicata, unless there exist spe-
cial reasons or impelling considerations for the adoption of 
such a pre-empting procedural course in the particular situa-
tion."193 
The court states no example of a special reason or impelling con-
sideration of the type to which it refers. 
Without passing on the doctrine as set out in the Orenstein 
case, it would appear that the absolute discretion in the trial court 
to marshal the trial produces an improvement over the present 
situation in Michigan. Whenever, under divided practice, a plain-
tiff has alternate or cumulative legal and equitable remedies, he 
must seek his relief separately.194 The plaintiff has the power to 
select his remedy, and thus the power to decide the method of 
trial. When a law claim by the plaintiff is subject to defeat by an 
equitable claim or defense,195 the trial of common issues depends 
upon which party first gets his claim to trial. If the plaintiff prose-
cutes his law action to judgment, the common issues will be tried 
by jury if demanded. If the defendant succeeds in commencing a 
chancery suit by way of defense, and succeeds in restraining fur-
ther prosecution of the law action before the common issue has 
been resolved, the issue will be tried to the court. In other words, 
whenever a number of claims, cross-claims, defenses, counter-
claims, or third-party claims involve an issue that is both legal and 
equitable, because it is common to both a legal and equitable 
claim, the method by which that issue is tried is now governed 
by which party happens to get his claim tried first. Whether or 
not a prior determination of a common issue is binding on the 
parties is governed by the doctrine of res judicata. The view 
stated in the Orenstein case allows the trial court absolute dis-
cretion to order which claim shall be tried first, and thus cause the 
common issue to become res judicata. Under present Michigan 
practice, the order in which claims -are presented, and thus the 
order in which common issues are tried is governed by accident. 
In all probability a more sensible result will obtain in the situa-
tion where the court has discretion to order the trial of claims after 
it has notice of all the issues in dispute, including the common 
193 Id. at 836. 
194 See ]oinder of Legal and Equitable Causes of Action, supra. 
195 See Equitable Defenses to Actions at Law, supra. 
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issue, than is the case where the question of jury vel non depends 
upon happenstance.196 
Professor Moore states that the right to jury trial on a particular 
issue of fact ought to turn upon the basic nature of that issue.197 
Indeed, if the distinction between actions at law and suits in equity 
is to be eliminated, no other approach can be tak.en.198 It is sub-
mitted that when an issue is common to both a legal and an equi-
table claim, it has but one basic nature.199 It should be regarded 
not as a legal and equitable issue, but as a legal or equitable issue. 
Such a concept would protect the right to jury trial. The res 
judicata effect of findings on common issues will not be modified 
by such ~ proposal. If a common issue were to be regarded as 
basically equitable, it would not be triable by jury for the reason 
that there would be no right to have it so tried. If regarded as 
basically legal, jury trial of the common issue would be mandatory 
upon proper demand, and the discretion of the trial court could 
not be used to avoid it. In this way, the constitutional right to 
trial by jury can be kept distinct from the trial court's discretion 
to marshal the trial in the furtherance of convenient trial adminis-
tration. An error by the trial judge in granting or denying a jury 
trial will be reviewable on appeal. Denial of a claim to jury trial 
would not be within the judge's discretion, as would appear to 
be the situation in the Orenstein case. 
Once an issue which is common to joined legal and equitable 
claims is regarded as having a single basic nature, it becomes neces-
196 An example in point is the situation set forth in JUDGMENTS REsrA'IEMENT §68, com-
ment j, illus. 4 (1942). "On the same day A and B make two contracts, by one of which B 
agrees to sell Blackacre to A and by the other he agrees to sell a horse to A. A brings 
a suit in equity for the specific performance of the first contract. B alleges he was an 
infant when the agreement was made. Verdict and judgment for B. Thereafter A brings 
an action at law against B for damages for breach of the contract to sell him the horse. 
The judgment in the prior suit is conclusive that the defendant was an infant when the 
contract was made." Thus, under present practice, the facts involved in the common 
issue of infancy would be tried to the court, because the plaintiff sought his equitable 
remedy first. This could be because the plaintiff intentionally wanted a trial to the court, 
but more than likely this factor did not even enter his mind when he decided which claim 
he would first proceed with. If the time of performance of each contract differed, plaintiff 
would probably sue upon whichever contract happened to be the first one breached. Upon 
joinder of the two claims under merged procedure, the trial court would have full per-
spective of both claims and the common issue. The court could decide what method of 
trial ought to be employed. How this latter question should be resolved is discussed infra. 
197 5 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, 2d ed., §38.16 (1951). 
198 See Right to Jury Trial, supra. 
199 It is unrealistic to say that an issue common to both a legal and an equitable claim 
may be tried by jury in one instance, and tried to the court in another with different 
results. In any event the issue will be tried by only one of the methods. See note 196 
and text supra. 
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sary to decide whether its nature is legal or equitable. This 
decision is part and parcel of the definition of the constitutional 
right to trial by jury. It is because of the constitutional guarantee 
that its nature must be ascertained. The question must therefore be 
determined by constitutional law. 
The right to jury trial is not defined or delineated in the con-
stitution; that document simply states that the right shall remain.200 
It is well settled that the right shall remain as it was at common law 
previous to the adoption of the constitution.201 By unavoidable 
implication, the constitution has directed that the courts shall 
define the right by judieial process. Procedure at present is not 
the same as it was before the constitution was adopted, and during 
the long history of changes in procedural statutes and rules, the 
Michigan courts have many times been called upon to define the 
right to jury trial in terms of the changes. And so ought the courts 
to decide the single nature of an issue in a particular case under 
the procedural merger of law and equity. The definition is one to 
be obtained by the judicial process. It cannot be set forth in rules 
of court, which are properly limited to those matters connected 
with the orderly dispatch of judicial business.202 Under present 
procedure, trial,by jury of an issue common to legal and equitable 
actions is a matter of fortuitous circumstances in most instances. 
Procedural merger, and regard of such issues as having a single 
basic nature would remove the element of chance from the right 
to jury, which, in view of the constitutional provision should be 
regarded as too important and fundamental a right to be governed 
in such a fortuitous manner. 
The Pre-Trial Conference 
The pre-trial conference was devised to expedite the progress 
and lessen the cost of litigation.203 The hearing itself requires the 
attendance of the pre-trial judge and opposing counsel, the three 
of whom meet together informally to discuss the formulation and 
simplification of issues, the possibility of agreeing to matters which 
will simplify or avoid proof at trial, and any other matters which 
200 MICH. CONST., art. II, §13. 
201 State Conservation Dept. v. Brown, 335 Mich. 343, 55 N.W. (2d) 859 (1952); Bielby 
v. Allender, 330 Mich. 12, 46 N.W. (2d) 445 (1951); Swart v. Kimball, 43 Mich. 443, 5 N.W. 
635 (1880). 
202 Joiner and Miller, "Rules of Practice and Procedure: A Study of Judicial Rule 
Making," 55 MICH, L. REv. 623 (1957), 
208 NIMS, PRE-TRIAL (1950). 
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might aid in the disposition of the action.204 The conference 
results in a pre-trial order entered by the judge, and, subject to 
modification either before or during trial, the order governs the 
subsequent course of the action.205 
It is readily apparent that the right to a jury and the problem 
of marshaling the trial are matters to which attention should be 
directed at the pre-trial conference. The process of narrowing the 
issues is aimed at avoiding trial on any issue not material to the 
rights of the parties. Often what began as complex issues are 
reduced to simple propositions of law or fact, or perhaps eliminated 
entirely from further consideration. Admissions of fact and docu-
ments not in dispute reduce the number of issues to be considered 
at trial.206 The pre-trial judge, with the power to make rulings 
on issues of law and on the admissibility of evidence can limit the 
burden of the trial court to the extent that issues decided and evi-
dence ruled inadmissible become settled before trial.207 Thus, 
as a result of the pre-trial activity, the trial judge will have fewer 
and simpler issues with which to contend. In a jurisdiction of 
combined law and equity procedures, such a result is especially 
welcome, since the entire process of arriving at and stating the 
issues at pre-trial tends to point up the sequence in which those 
issues ought to be tried. Marshaling a trial constituting both legal 
and equitable issues, therefore, may be accomplished in an efficient 
businesslike manner, with considerable saving in time and expense. 
In addition to reducing the number of issues involved in an 
action, the pre-trial conference provides an excellent point at 
which to obtain a ruling on the right to jury trial.208 After such 
204 Sunderland, "The Theory and Practice of Pre-Trial Procedure," 36 MICH. L. R:Ev. 
215 (1938); Cooper, "Pre-Trial Procedure in the Wayne County Circuit Court," SIXTH AN-
NUAL REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF MICHIGAN 61 (1936). 
205 "The court shall make an order which recites the action taken at the conference, 
the amendments allowed to the pleadings, and the agreements made by the parties as to 
any of the matters considered, and which limits the issues for trial to those not disposed of 
by admissions or agreements of counsel; and such order when entered controls the sub-
sequent course of the action, unless modified at the trial to prevent manifest injustice." 
Rule 16, Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., 28 U.S.C. (1952). 
206 See Rule 36, Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., 28 U.S.C. (1952). 
207 See American Machine &: Metals, Inc. v. De Bothezat Impeller Co., Inc., (S.D. N.Y. 
1949) 82 F. Supp. 556, affd. (2d Cir. 1949) 180 F. (2d) 342, cert. den. 339 U.S. 979 (1950) 
(ruling at pre-trial on the legal sufficiency of a defense); Schram v. Kolowich, (E.D. Mich. 
1942) 2 F.R.D. 343 (ruling on application of the statute of limitations); Ulrich v. Ethyl 
Gasoline Corp., (W.D. Ky. 1942) 2 F.R.D. 357 (ruling on the admissibility of evidence, the 
right to jury trial, and whether a prior decree was an estoppel between the parties). 
208 Ulrich v. Ethyl Gasoline Corp., note 207 supra. 
1957] UNION OF LAW AND EQUITY 1105 
a determination has been made the action can be placed in the 
proper channel for the jury or the non-jury trial. If a jury has 
been granted and there exist non-jury issues to be tried as well, 
a simple recitation of this fact along with a statement of the issues 
involved will greatly facilitate the trial judge in marshaling the 
trial so that the most efficient use may be made of the jury's time 
or the pre-trial order can provide rules for such marshaling as 
indicated by the conference. 
Review of Fact Questions on Appeal 
At present the scope of appellate review of fact questions 
depends upon whether the trial was at law or in equity. Generally, 
a jury verdict is conclusive on fact issues if there was evidence to 
support it, while in chancery appeals, questions of fact are review-
able. If the distinction between actions at law and suits in chancery 
are removed, a method must be found by which the appeal court 
can ascertain the proper scope of appeal on all questions of fact 
brought before it. 
Under merged procedure, the scope of review on appeal can 
be made to turn upon the method of trial below. Facts tried to a 
jury of right would be subject to review as in actions at law under 
present procedure. In cases where the trial was to the court, the 
present chancery rules would apply. The test is as elemental as 
that under divided procedure where the scope of review depends 
on the character of the entire action. The results are similar. 
Law issues which have been tried to the court should, under 
merged procedure, be subject to the same scope of review as are 
equitable issues. Such a result would not entail substantial change 
from present Michigan practice in this respect, since court rule 
64 allows the appellant in a non-jury law action to assign as error 
that the judgment is against the preponderance of the evidence.209 
In an exhaustive opinion, this rule was held constitutional in 
Jones v. Eastern Michigan Motorbuses.210 The majority of the 
court stated that the review of a court-tried law action was an exer-
cise of the court's appellate jurisdiction, and that in the exercise 
209 "Upon appeal to the Supreme Court from a judgment in an action at law tried 
without a jury, such judgment may be affirmed or reversed, the cause remanded with direc-
tions, or a new trial ordered. Appellant may assign as error that the judgment is against 
the preponderance of the evidence. • • ." Michigan Court Rule 64 (19!l!l). 
210 287 Mich. 619, 28!1 N.W. 710 (1939). 
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of such power, the court may "inaugurate or utilize any appropriate 
writ or procedure as in its judgment may be deemed fit."211 The 
opinion traced the history of statutes and rules dealing with review 
of law actions tried without a jury. In brief, the court found that 
it had been restricted to review of questions of law in such actions 
only during the period from 1867 to 1915. As early as 1862, the 
opinion states, the court had considered appeal of non-jury law 
cases and concluded: 
"The position of the case in this court is similar to that of a 
case heard in Chancery on pleadings and proofs, and appealed 
to this court. The facts are supposed to be all before the court, 
and the decision upon them [by the supreme court] disposes 
of the case.''212 
The Jones opinion further notes that present rule 64 was first 
adopted as rule 75 in 1931.213 Appended to a rule which abolished 
special findings in court-tried law actions, and referred to by the 
official note to rule 75, is the following comment: 
"The trial of a law case without a jury involves exactly 
the same essential procedure as the trial of an equity case, 
and the functions performed by the court are practically iden-
tical in both cases. There is no substantial reason why both 
should not be tried in the same manner and be finally disposed 
of in the same way. The only feature of a common law action 
which ever made necessary·a different procedure from that in 
equity, was the jury, and when the jury is absent the sole 
reason for diversity in practice disappears."214 
Although not mentioned by the court in the Jones case, it 
would seem that Brown v. Kalamazoo Circuit Judge, discussed 
earlier,215 is to some extent overruled. The holding in that case 
that there exists a constitutional right to have equitable contro-
versies dealt with by equitable methods is inconsistent with the 
211 Id. at 646. 
212 Barman v. Carhartt, IO Mich. 338 at 341 (1862). 
213 "Upon appeal from a judgment rendered in an action at law tried without a jury, 
such judgment may be affirmed, reversed or modified, in whole or in part, and a final 
judgment shall be entered either by the supreme court or by the trial court, according 
to the practice in equity cases." Michigan Court Rule 75 (1931). It was stated by the court 
in Jones v. Eastern Michigan Motorbuses, note 210 supra, that there was no intention to 
change the scope of review in law cases tried without a jury by virtue of the 1933 rule. 
The only change contemplated in rule 64 being that the supreme court is not empowered 
to enter judgment after a modification of the judgment rendered below. 
214 Notes following Michigan Court Rule 37, §11 (1931). 
215 Note 5 supra. 
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Jones case which states that the supreme court may inaugurate 
any procedure it may deem fit in the exercise of its appellate 
jurisdiction. Clearly the Jones case supports de novo review of 
non-jury law actions and, to the extent that the earlier case is in-
consistent, it is overruled. 
Thus it is submitted that unification of legal and equitable 
actions would not complicate but would simplify the scope of 
review on appeal. The method of review would tum on the 
simple objective test of whether the fact issue was determined by 
a jury or a judge. Such a result would allow the reviewing court 
to dispose of an entire case at one time so that, except for errors 
of law in jury cases, remand to ~e lower court for final adjudica-
tion consistent with the appellate conclusions would not be neces-
sary. Extension of the trial de novo, of course, would remain 
subject to the self-announced reluctance of reviewing courts to 
upset findings of trial judges who by presence in court are able to 
perceive the demeanor and determine the credibility of witnesses 
and the rule that findings of fact on conflicting evidence will not 
be set aside and a new determination made unless the conclusions 
below were clearly against the preponderance of evidence.216 
CONCLUSION 
The constitution of Michigan demands that the distinctions 
between law and equity be abolished. A merger of the two forms 
of action has been demonstrated to be practical and effective by 
twenty-eight states and the federal courts. There are many occa-
sions of hardship in Michigan as the result of the failure to take 
a more forthright position in respect to the amalgamation of law 
and equity. Halfway measures in Michigan and elsewhere have 
proved ineffective. There is nothing essentially different in the 
commencement of the actions and the joinder of parties which 
would prevent complete amalgamation of law-equity procedure. 
There is no need to confuse the substance of law and equity with 
the devices used to enforce the substantive rules. The procedures 
can be merged and yet maintain the essential character of the sub-
216 Illustrative is the case of Collins v. Hull, 256 Mich. 507 at 511, 240 N.W. 37 (1932), 
in which the court stated, "while, under Court Rule No. 75 [1931], we may consider the 
case de nova, we are unwilling to determine the correctness of the amount of damages with-
out some indication by the trial judge who has heard all of the testimony and seen the 
witnesses, of what the amount should be." 
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stantive rules of each. The preservation of the right to jury trial 
and in Michigan the right to a court trial in equity suits does not 
present insurmountable problems. The problems arising in the 
amalgamated practice are no different from those in the separate 
practice. In each case it is a constitutional problem-no more, no 
less. No rule or statute can change this. The only change required 
as a result of a merger has to do with a difference in time and 
method of raising the .question pertaining to jury trial. Other 
states and the federal courts have solved this problem in a satis-
factory manner. The widespread use of the pre-trial conference 
should substantially eliminate procedural difficulties in this re-
spect. Properly used, the pre-trial conference can be the device 
through which the trial is marshaled and decisions made as to 
whether or not juries are to be used to hear issues in a case. 
There is nothing in the appeal processes of either law or equity 
cases that will cause problems as a result of amalgamation. Thus 
in order to provide the full benefit of a merged procedure five 
rul_es are needed: the first to provide for a single form of action; 
the second to provide for 'the joinder of law and equity matters; 
the third and fourth to preserve the right to jury trial, provide 
the procedure for asserting the right and for marshaling the trial; 
and the fifth to utilize the pre-trial conference as a device for solv-
ing the problems. The adoption of these rules, modeled after 
the present federal rules but amplified in important detail, will 
eliminate many cases from the dockets and permit one trial where 
now two or more are required. 
Rule 1. There shall be one form of action to be known as 
"civil action." 
Rule 2. In any pleading a pleader may join either as in-
dependent or as alternate claims as many claims either legal 
or equitable or both as he may have against an opposing party. 
Rule 3. (a) Right Preserved. The right of trial by jury 
as declared by the constitution or as given by statute shall be 
preserved to the parties inviolate. 
(b) Demand. Any party may demand a trial by jury of 
any issue triable of right by a jury by serving upon the other 
parties a demand therefor in writing at any time after the 
commencement of the action and not later than IO days after 
the services of the last pleading directed to such issue. Such 
demand may be indorsed upon a pleading of the party. 
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(c) Specification of Issues. In his demand for jury trial 
a party may specify the issues which he wishes so tried; other-
wise he shall be deemed to have demanded trial by jury for 
all the issues so triable. If he has demanded trial by jury for 
only some of the issues, any other party within 10 days after 
service of the demand or such lesser time as the court may 
order, may serve a demand for trial by jury of any other or 
all of the issues of fact in the action. 
(d) Waiver. The failure of a party to serve a demand 
as required by this rule and to file it as required by rule con-
stitutes a waiver by him of trial by jury. A waiver of trial by 
jury is not revoked by an amendment of a pleading asserting 
only a claim or defense arising out of the conduct, transaction, 
or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the 
original pleading. A demand for trial by jury made as herein 
provided may not be withdrawn without the consent of the 
parties. 
Rule 4. (a) By Jury. When trial by jury has been 
demanded as provided in rule 3, the action shall be designated 
upon the docket as a jury action. The trial of all issues so de-
manded shall be by jury, unless (I) the parties or their attor-
neys of record, by written stipulation filed with the court or 
by an oral stipulation made in open court and entered in the 
record, consent to trial by the court sitting without a jury or 
(2) the court upon motion or of its own initiative finds that a 
right of trial by jury of some or all of those issues does not 
exist under the constitution or statutes of the state. 
(b) By the Court. Issues not demanded for trial by jury 
as provided in rule 3 shall be tried by the court; but, notwith-
standing the failure of a party to demand a jury as to an issue 
in an action in which such a demand might have been made 
of right, the court in its discretion upon motion may order a 
trial by a jury of any or all issues. 
(c) Sequence of Trial. When certain of the issues are 
to be tried by jury and others by the court, or where a number 
of claims, cross-claims, defenses, counterclaims, or third-party 
claims involve a common issue, the court may determine the 
sequence in which such issues are to be tried, preserving at all 
times the constitutional right to trial by jury according to the 
basic nature of every issue to which a demand for jury as pro-
vided by rule 3 has been served and filed. 
(d) Advisory Jury and Trial by Consent. In all actions 
not triable of right by a jury the court upon motion or of its 
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own initiative may try any issue with an advisory jury or, the 
court, with the consent of both parties, may order a trial with 
a jury whose verdict has the same effect as if trial by jury had 
been a matter of right. 
Rule 5. In every contested action the court shall direct 
the attorneys for the parties to appear before it for a confer-
ence to consider the consolidation of cases for trial, the sep-
aration of issues, and the order of the trial when some issues 
are to be tried to a jury and some to the court. 
APPENDIX A 
Courts Having But One "Side" for Law and Equity 
Arizona, Rev. Stat. Ann. (1956) Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 2. 
Arkansas, Stat. Ann. (1947) §27-201 
California, Code Civ. Proc. Ann. (Deering, 1953) §307 
Colorado, Rule 2, Rules of Civil Procedure (1951) 
Connecticut, Gen. Stat. (1949) §§7738, 7813, 7819 
Georgia, Code Ann. (1936) §§3-104, 37-901, 37-902 
Idaho, Code (1948) §5-101 
Indiana, Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1946) §2-101 
Kansas, Gen. Stat. Ann. (Corrick, 1949) §60-201 
Kentucky, Rule 2, Rules of Civil Procedure (1953) 
Minnesota, Rule 2.01, Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts 
(1952) 
Missouri, Rev. Stat. (1949) §506.040 
Montana, Rev. Code. Ann. (1947) §93-2301 
Nebraska, Rev. Stat. (1943) §25-101 
Nevada, Comp. Laws (1929) §8500 
New Mexico, Rule 2, Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts 
(1953) 
New York, Civil Practice Act (Cahill-Parsons, 1955) §8 
North Carolina, CoNsT., art. 4, §1; Gen. Stat. (1953) §1-9 
North Dakota, Rev. Code. (1953) §32-0109 
Ohio, Rev. Code (Baldwin, 1953) §2307.02 
Oklahoma, Stat. (1951) tit. 12, §10 
South Carolina, Code (1952) §10-8 
South Dakota, Code (1939) §33.0101 
Texas, CONST., art. 5, §8 
United States Courts, Rule 2, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 
u.s.c. (1952) 
Utah, CONST., art. 8, §19; Rule 2, Rules of Civil Procedure (1953) 
· Washington, Rev. Code (1951) §4.04.020 
Wisconsin, Stat. (1955) §260.08 
Wyoming, Comp. Stat. Ann. (1945) §3-301 
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Courts Having a Law "Side" and an Equity "Side" 
Alabama, Code (1940) tit. 13, §§126, 129 
Florida, CONST., art. 5, §II 
Illinois, CONST., art. 6, §12; Rev. Stat. (1955) c. IIO, §§31, IOI.I 
Iowa, Code (1954) §611.3 
Maine, Rev. Stat. (1954) c. 107, §2 
Maryland, Code Ann. (Flack, 1951) art. 16, §102; art. 75, §125 
Massachusetts, Laws Ann. (1956) c. 212, §§3, 4; c. 214, §§1 to 4 
Michigan, Comp. Laws. (1948) §611.1 
New Hampshire, Rev. Stat. Ann. (1955) §§491.7, 498.l 
New Jersey, CoNsT., art. 6, §3 
Oregon, Rev. Stat. (1955) §§11.010, 11.020 
Pennsylvania, Rules 1501, 1502, Rules of Civil Procedure (1954) 
Rhode Island, Gen. Laws (1938) c. 496, §§6, 7 
Virginia, Code (1950) §§8-138, 17-123 
West Virginia, CoNsT., art. 8, §12; Code (1955) §5196 
Separate Courts of Law and Equity 
1111 
Delaware, CoNST., art. 4; Code Ann. (1953) tit. IO, §§341, 342, 343, 541 
Mississippi, CONST., §§156, 157, 159 
Tennessee, Code Ann. (Williams, 1934) tit. 9, IO 
Vermont, Stat. (1947) §§1277, 1278, 1400 
Note: As the development in Louisiana has been completely different, 
no attempt has been made to include that state. 
APPENDIX B 
Joinder of Claims for Legal and Equitable Relief Permitted 
Arizona, Rev. Stat. Ann. (1956) Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 18 (a) 
Arkansas, Stat. Ann. (1947) §27-1301 
California, Code Civ. Proc. Ann. (Deering, 1953) §§307, 427 
Colorado, Rule 18, Rules of Civil Procedure (1951) 
Connecticut, Gen. Stat. (1949) §7819 
Florida, Rule 1.8 (g), Rules of Civil Procedure (1955) 
Georgia, Code Ann. (1936) §81-101 
Idaho, Code (1948) §§5-101, 5-606 
Illinois, Rev. Stat. (1955) c. ll0, §44 
Indiana, Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1946) §2-101 
Iowa, Rule 22, Rules of Civil Procedure (1954) 
Kansas, Gen. Stat. Ann. (Corrick, 1949) §60-601 
Kentucky, Rule 18.01, Rules of Civil Procedure (1953) 
Minnesota, Rule 18, Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts 
(1952) 
Missouri, Rev. Stat. (1949) §509.060 
Montana, Rev. Code Ann. (1947) §93.3203 
Nebraska, Rev. Stat. (1943) §25.701 
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Nevada, Comp. Laws (1929) §§8500, 8595 
New Jersey, Rule 4:31-1, Civil Practice Rules (1953) 
New Mexico, Rule 18, Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts 
(1953) 
New York, Civil Practice Act (Cahill-Parsons, 1955) §258 
North Carolina, Gen. Stat. (1953) §1-123 
North Dakota, Rev. Code (1943) §28-0703 
Ohio, Rev. Code (Baldwin, 1953) §2309.05 
Oklahoma, Stat. (1951) tit. 12, §265 
Oregon, Rev. Stat. (1955) §16.220 
South Carolina, Code (1952) §10-701 
South Dakota, Code (1939) §33.0916 
Texas, Rule 51, Rules of Civil Procedure (1955) 
United States Courts, Rule 18, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 
u.s.c. (1952) 
Utah, Rule 18, Rules of Civil Procedure (1953) 
Washington, Rev. Code (1951) §§4.04.020, 4.36.150 
Wisconsin, Stat. (1955) §263.04 
Wyoming, Comp. Stat. Ann. (1945) §3-701 
APPENDIX C 
Equitable Defense in Actions for Legal Relief Permitted 
Alabama, Code (1940) tit. 13, §153 
Arizona, Rev. Stat. Ann. (1956) Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 8 (£} 
Arkansas, Stat. Ann. (1947) §27-1121 
California, Code Civ. Proc. Ann. (Deering, 1953) §§307, 441 
Colorado, Rule 8, Rules of Civil Procedure (1951) 
Connecticut, Gen. Stat. (1949) §7738 
Florida, Rule 1.8 (g), Rules of Civil Procedure (1955) 
Georgia, Code Ann. (1936) §37-905 
Idaho, Code (1948) §5-616 
Illinois, Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 110, §43 
Indiana, Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1946) §2-1015 
Iowa, Rule 72, Rules of Civil Procedure (1954) 
Kansas, Gen. Stat. Ann. (Corrick, 1949) §60-710 
Kentucky, Rule 8.05, Rules of Civil Procedure (1953) 
Maine, Rev. Stat. (1954) c. 113, §18 
Maryland, Code Ann. (Flack, 1951) art. 75, §91 
Massachusetts, Laws Ann. (1955) c. 231, §31 
Minnesota: Rule 8, Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts 
(1952) 
Missouri, Rev. Stat. (1949) §509.110 
Montana, Rev. Code Ann. (1947) §93-3410 
Nebraska, Rev. Stat. (1943) §25-812 
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Nevada, Comp. Laws (1929) §§8500, 8602 
New Jersey, Rule 4:8-5, Civil Practice Rules (1953) 
New Mexico, Rule 8, Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts 
(1953) 
New York, Civil Practice Act (Cahill-Parsons, 1955) §262 
North Carolina, Gen. Stat. (1953) §1-138 
North Dakota, Rev. Code (1943) §28.0715 
Ohi.o, Rev. Code (Baldwin, 1953) §2309.14 
Oklahoma, Stat. (1951) tit. 12, §272 
Oregon, Rev. Stat. (1955) §16.460 
Rhode Island, Gen. Laws (1938) c. 520, §9 
South Carolina, Code (1952) §§10-703, 10-704 
South Dakota, Code (1939) §33.0911 
Texas, Rule 48, Rules of Civil Procedure (1955) 
United States Courts, Rule 8, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 
u.s.c. (1952) 
Utah, Rule 8, Rules of Civil Procedure (1953) 
Washington, Rev. Code (1951) §4.32.090 
Wisconsin, Stat. (1955) §263.16 
Wyoming, Comp. Stat. Ann. (1945) §3-1312 
APPENDIX D 
Equitable Counterclaim in Actions for Legal Relief Permitted 
Arizona, Code Ann. (1939) §21-507 
Arkansas, Rev. Stat. Ann. (1956) Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 18 (a) 
California, Code Civ. Proc. Ann. (Deering, 1953) §§307, 441 
Colorado, Rule 18, Rules of Civil Procedure (1951) 
Connecticut, Gen. Stat. (1949) §7818 
Florida, Rule 1.8 (g), Rules of Civil Procedure (1955) 
Georgia, Code Ann. (1936) §37-905 
Idaho, Code (1948) §5-616 
Illinois, Rev. Stat. (1955) c. ll0, §44 
Indiana, Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1946) §2-1015 
Iowa, Rule 31, Rules of Civil Procedure (1954) 
Kansas, Gen. Stat. Ann. (Corrick, 1949) §60-710 
Kentucky, Rule 18.01, Rules of Civil Procedure (1953) 
Maine, Rev. Stat. (1954) c. ll3, §18 
Minnesota, Rule 18, Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts 
(1952) 
Missouri, Rev. Stat. (1949) §509.060 
Montana, Rev. Code Ann. (1947) §93.3410 
Nebraska, Rey. Stat. (1943) §25-812 
Nevada, Comp. Laws (1929) §8606 
1114 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55 
New Jersey, Rule 4.31-1, Civil Practice Rules (1953) 
New Mexico, Rule 18, Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts 
(1953) 
New York, Civil Practice Act (Cahill-Parsons, 1955) §262 
North Carolina, Gen. Stat. (1953) §1-138 
North Dakota, Rev. Code (1943) §28-0715 
Ohio, Rev. Code (Baldwin, 1953) §2309.14 
Oklahoma, Stat. (1951) tit. 12, §272 
Oregon, Rev. Stat. (1955) §16.460 
South Carolina, Code (1952) §10-704 
South Dakota, Code (1939) §33.09II 
Texas, Rule 48, Rules of Civil Procedure (1955) 
United States Courts, Rule 18, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 
u.s.c. (1952) 
Utah, Rule 18, Rules of Civil Procedure (1953) 
Washington, Rev. Code (1951) §4.32.090 
Wisconsin, Stat. (1955) §263.04 
Wyoming, Comp. Stat. Ann. (1945) §3-1312 
